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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
RULES BASED MODELING OF DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEMS WITH FAULTS
AND THEIR DIAGNOSIS
Failure diagnosis in large and complex systems is a critical task. In the realm of discrete
event systems, Sampath et al. proposed a language based failure diagnosis approach. They
introduced the diagnosability for discrete event systems and gave a method for testing the
diagnosability by first constructing a diagnoser for the system. The complexity of this
method of testing diagnosability is exponential in the number of states of the system and
doubly exponential in the number of failure types. In this thesis, we give an algorithm for
testing diagnosability that does not construct a diagnoser for the system, and its complexity
is of 4th order in the number of states of the system and linear in the number of the failure
types.
In this dissertation we also study diagnosis of discrete event systems (DESs) modeled in
the rule-based modeling formalism introduced in [12] to model failure-prone systems. The
results have been represented in [43].
An attractive feature of rule-based model is it’s compactness (size is polynomial in number
of signals). A motivation for the work presented is to develop failure diagnosis techniques
that are able to exploit this compactness. In this regard, we develop symbolic techniques
for testing diagnosability and computing a diagnoser. Diagnosability test is shown to be
an instance of 1st order temporal logic model-checking. An on-line algorithm for diagnoser
synthesis is obtained by using predicates and predicate transformers.
We demonstrate our approach by applying it to modeling and diagnosis of a part of the
assembly-line. When the system is found to be not diagnosable, we use sensor refinement
and sensor augmentation to make the system diagnosable. In this dissertation, a controller
is also extracted from the maximally permissive supervisor for the purpose of implementing
the control by selecting, when possible, only one controllable event from among the ones
allowed by the supervisor for the assembly line in automaton models.
KEYWORDS: Discrete event system, Rules based model, Diagnosability, Diagnoser, First
order temporal logic, Model checking.
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Chapter 1
Modeling and Diagnosis of DESs
1.1 Introduction
“Systems diagnostics is a systems-oriented problem-solving-methodology able both to
identify the operational (health) status and to select or design the appropriate remedial
or corrective action (therapy) that would most efficiently restore the functioning of the
diagnosed dynamics system to the desired level. It includes a collection of diagnostic meth-
ods, models, concepts, principles and approaches that permit us to detect and identify the
functional, structural, organizational and behavioral malfunctions, breakdowns, disorders or
deficiencies in various dynamic systems.”[60]
“An on-going task in engineering is to increase the reliability, availability and safety of
technical processes.”[45]
These quotes point to the importance of failure diagnosis and recovery. This is the topic
we explore for discrete event systems.
Whether it refers to medicine, where human subjects are involved, or to engineering,
where technical systems are dealt with, diagnosis is the task of finding the cause of a mis-
behavior. According to Webster Dictionary the meaning of the term diagnosis is defined as
the act or process of deciding the nature of a diseased condition by examinations, as well
as a careful investigation of facts to determine the nature of a thing. This definition bears
semblance to the mathematical approaches to the study of diagnosis [60][90]. The term di-
agnosis has Greek origin: “dia gignoskein”, that means “knowing the difference”. That is,
diagnosis involves the act of distinguishing one case from another, of separating a relevant
item from the general context. In that sense, diagnosis is closely related to categorization,
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to the act of labeling or classifying.
In literature there may be found several definitions for the term fault. The Webster
dictionary defines the term fault as a defect in quality or constitution. Within the engineering
community a fault is regarded as physical condition that causes a device, a component
or, an element to fail to perform in a required manner. The Reliability, Availability and
Maintainability (RAM) Dictionary defines the fault as an accidental condition that causes a
previously functional unit to fail to perform its required function. In the same source fault
is regarded as an immediate cause of a failure (often classified based on duration, extent,
value and whether the cause was physical or humane). In turn, a failure is defined as an
event that makes equipment deviate from specified limits of useful performance, or that
terminates the ability of a unit’s material or structure from performing its required function.
Due to failure, a malfunction occurs, which is defined to be the inability of a system or
system component to perform a required function within specified limits (inability to meet
or conform to a specified requirement). The discrepancy between a computed, observed or
measured value or condition/requirement, and true, specified or theoretically correct value
or condition/requirement is termed error.
In our work, “failure” and “fault” mean the same and are used interchangeably. They
refer to a non-permitted deviation in the behavior of the system (or a component of the
system) for a bounded or unbounded period of time. A stuck-close valve, decrease in the
efficiency of a heat exchanger, abnormal bias in the output of a sensor, and leakage in
pipelines are examples of failure. If after the occurrence of a failure, the system remains
in the faulty condition indefinitely, then the failure is called permanent. Otherwise, it is
non-permanent or transient. A broken shaft in a motor is an example of permanent failure,
and a loose wire could be the source of a transient failure in an electrical system.
A typical fault diagnosis system uses the outputs of the sensors of the system to detect
the failure and (if necessary) isolate (locate) the source of failure. Once a failure is detected,
a decision has to be made as to how it should be recovered from. It is necessary to detect
and further isolate the source of failure to be able to perform failure recovery effectively. So,
a failure recovery problem involves a failure-diagnosis problem.
1.2 Failure diagnosis: Motivation and Approaches
There are three major factors that motivate research on failure diagnosis:
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1. failures are inevitable;
2. failure diagnosis is needed for recovery; and
3. failure diagnosis is a complex task.
Failures are inevitable in today’s complex industrial environment. Given the complex in-
teractions between components, sub-systems, and processes, a system failure can well be
considered to be a “normal” occurrence [85], or an inherent characteristic of most industrial
systems.
If a failure is detected late, it might “spread”, and cause unnecessary operational dis-
turbances, and even material and personal damage. Timely and accurate detection of these
failures may prevent the cascaded effect that simple failures produce, resulting in system-
wide breakdowns and major accidents.
Also, a failure may well be easy to fix, but hard to find. A skilled operator can often
quickly isolate the failure in systems (s)he is familiar with, but as systems grow more com-
plex, this manual diagnosis becomes more difficult, and specialists capable of performing it
are more expensive to train. It is therefore of interest to have, if not totally automated, so-
phisticated diagnosis tool for complex systems. In view of the above mentioned factors, one
can easily appreciate automated mechanisms for the timely and accurate diagnosis of fail-
ures. Indeed, this need is well understood and appreciated both in industry and in academia.
A great deal of research effort has been and is being spent in the design and development of
automated diagnostic systems; and a variety of schemes, differing both in their theoretical
framework and in their design and implementation philosophy, have been proposed.
A traditional approach to diagnosis used in many industrial systems is simple limit check-
ing of signal values and predefined threshold logic. For example, if a sensor value leaves its
normal range, an alarm is generated. Due to cascaded effect of failure propagation in the
system, often a number of alarms are set off and then the problem is to isolate the root
cause. Common methods used are fault trees and expert systems, although these methods
are not restricted only to alarm analysis.
1.2.1 Non-model based approaches
In this section we briefly describe some approaches with the common feature that they
explicitly associate a known failure with an observed misbehavior. The kind of pattern-
matching methods these approaches use are often called associative.
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Fault trees
Fault tree analysis is a widely used technique in the process control industry for reliability
analysis, fault detection and isolation. The basic idea is that a failure can trigger other
failures or events in the system and this can be traced back to the root cause [35][109]. A
fault tree graphically represents a cause-effect relationship among the failures in the system.
The root of a fault tree, the so called TOP event, is a system failure. The leaves of the tree
are the possibly contributing atomic events or basic faults, and inner nodes are AND- and
OR- type. Sets of events that trigger the top event are computed using cut sets and minimal
cut sets. By assigning probabilities to the atomic events, a failure probability can be found.
Fault tree construction is laborious and error prone, and much work has been done on
computer assisted and automatic fault tree construction, see for instance [58][25][110].
Expert systems
A popular method for diagnosis and supervision of complex systems has been the use of
expert systems, often in conjunction with fault tree structures, see, e.g., [101][107]. Expert
systems are especially well suited for systems that are difficult to model, with complex
interactions between and within components. Domain experts have heuristic knowledge
of the system and of how symptoms relate to faults. In traditional expert systems, this
knowledge is represented in a rule-base and used in conjunction with an inference engine.
This heuristic approach has several drawbacks. Acquiring knowledge from experts is
difficult and time consuming, and for new systems a considerable amount of time might
elapse before enough knowledge has accumulated to make reliable diagnosis possible.
Chronicles
An expert system-like approach to diagnosis of dynamic systems using temporal infor-
mation, is the real-time situation recognition method described in [8][73]. For system under
consideration, a set of events, obtainable for instance by signal processing, is defined. A
number of situations, that are considered desirable to recognize, are characterized with these
events, and also the temporal constraints among the events. Such a characterization of a
situation is called a chronicle and can correspond both to correct operation and failures of
the system. A situation recognizer is then fed with observed and time-stamped events in
real-time and can notify an operator for example when a failure situation has occurred or is
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under development. Of course only known situation can be recognized.
Fuzzy logic based approach
Tsukamoto and Terano used a set of fuzzy relational inequalities in order to describe the
intensity of the causal deterministic relationships existing between faults (as causes) and the
determined symptoms (as effects) [106]. Since then this idea has been successfully applied
for diagnosis of complex industrial processes, based on subjectively observed symptoms, see
[27][51]. Sanchez has built up a “symptoms-faults” fuzzy relational mapping by directly
encoding expert medical diagnostic knowledge [100]. As a result, A fuzzy rule based fault
detection and diagnosis system can be developed by combining fuzzy linguistic rules with
non-fuzzy numerical data [119]. The design of the fuzzy reference set, inference mechanism,
and signal coding and decoding policies are dependent on the problem background.
Bayesian networks based approach
Bayesian network has been referred to by different names in the literature: Bayes belief
net [83], causal probabilistic network [94], causal networks [61], probabilistic causal networks
[19], and influence diagrams [40]. At the qualitative level, it is a graph where the nodes
represent domain objects and the arcs between nodes represent causal relationships between
objects, which is then modeled by conditional probabilities, and processed via the Bayes-
Laplace formula [24]. Bayesian network can be used to study the diagnosis problem. It
computes the probabilistic evidence of the unobserved part of the domain given that a part
of the domain (the symptoms variables) has known or assumed values (in form of probability
distributions).
This approach has its own drawbacks. The priori necessary probabilistic information is
not always available and event independence does not always hold. Computation complexity
is almost intractable [29].
Neural network
A neural network being applied for fault detection and diagnosis is developed through
‘learning’, i.e. ‘learning from examples’, even if one does not know the ‘if-then’ kind of
linguistic rules or process principle in detail [53]. The design of neural network architectures
and learning algorithms depends on the forms of learning examples. The key task is to
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establish a neural network with an associative memory which can classify the input space into
a number of fault related domains. The learning algorithm designed mainly depends on the
informative form and content in the training samples; generally, ‘BP-learning’, ‘reinforcement
learning’, or ‘self-organized learning’ can be used. The fault diagnosis or decision making for
control actions is a more complicated problem, particularly for a high dimensional, nonlinear,
and uncertain system.
1.2.2 Model based approaches
The basic idea of all model based diagnosis is to compare observations of the real system
with the predictions from a model. In the case of a fault, a discrepancy between the actual
observed behavior and the predicted behavior arises. This discrepancy can then be used
to detect, isolate and identify the fault depending on the type of model and methods used.
Several approaches to model based diagnosis with model paradigms ranging from differential
equations to qualitative behavior models have appeared in the literature and proven useful
in practice.
Analytical redundancy methods
In the control system community, the most common class of model based diagnosis
method proposed is the analytical redundancy method, see for instance [114][81][28][74]
[92] and references therein. These methods are based on the fact that observed signals from
the system, such as sensor measurement and control signals, contain information regarding
the system state. The desired state information can be extracted with the help of a good
differential equation model of the system, often obtained by physical modeling, or system
identification [70].
In general, these methods consist of two steps. First, residuals are generated by comparing
observed signals from the system with predicted values. These residuals are usually designed
to be zero if no fault is present. Second, a fault detection and isolation step is employed,
using these residuals as input. One of the main problems with this approach is the difficulty
in acquiring good enough models. The demands on the accuracy of the models are usually
higher than for control design, since the residual generator works open-loop. Robust methods
for residual generation has received considerable attention in recent years and is an active
research area, see, e.g., [81][82].
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Recently, there have also been some efforts towards formally demonstrating the connec-
tions between the analytical redundancy methods and the model-based approaches in AI
briefly described in [74].
Model based approaches in AI
In artificial intelligence, model-based diagnosis from first principles, is pioneered by Re-
iter [91]. The basic idea is to predict the behavior of the system using behavioral and
structural models of the system and its components and compare it with observations of the
actual behavior of the real system. Two main characterizations of model based diagnosis
exists in the literature, consistency based diagnosis [91] and adductive diagnosis [87]. The
former needs a model of the correct behavior only, and a diagnosis is a set of components
that when assumed non-correct, makes the predicted behavior consistent with the observed.
The adductive approach must have models of the faulty behavior. A diagnosis is a set of
component faults that is not only consistent with, but also explicitly predicts the observed
behavior. A good introduction to model-based diagnosis is the Chapter 2 of [30], and for a
comprehensive collection of literature, see [34].
Model based diagnosis in AI is mainly aimed at static systems and especially at trou-
bleshooting combinatorial digital circuits. The extension of the methodology to dynamic
and time-varying systems remains an active research area, see., [30][17][18][113].
Template based approach
A method for fault monitoring of automated manufacturing systems using the timing
and sequencing of events has recently been developed by Holloway et al. [39][37][21][78]. So
called time templates or condition templates are used to specify the expected, correct timing
and sequencing of events. Templates are designed to be easily implemented on distributed
architectures and are used to detect deviations from the correct behavior. Specific faults can
not be diagnosed. The method is capable of monitoring event sequences corresponding to an
arbitrary number of concurrent timed automata, and a timed automata specification can be
automatically translated to templates [39][78]. The manual construction of templates is not
feasible when timed automata model is not known, and work has been done on identifying
templates from observations of sequences of events [21].
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A state based DES approach to diagnosis failure
A discrete event system approach for diagnosis is proposed by Lin [67] and further treated
in [5]. The system is modeled as a finite state machine, where the states of the machine
describe conditions of the components. The only dynamics in the FSM is that the system can
transit from normal to faulty, and no normal behavior is modeled. The observations (sensor
readings) are included as a mapping from the fault states to certain observable events (tests).
Diagnosing a fault is equivalent to identifying which state or set of states the system belongs
to. Off-line and on-line diagnosis are treated separately.
In off-line diagnosis the system is thought to be in a test-bed, where the system does not
change stage unless it is forced to while under diagnosis. Test can be performed, and the
outcome of the tests are called observable events. The off-line diagnosability of the system is
analyzed with respect to a fault partition and the set of observable events (i.e., tests). Since
the system is in a test-bed, the order in which the tests are performed does not affect the
diagnosability.
In on-line diagnosis, the system is in normal operation, and hence it can change state
uncontrollably. The system is assumed to be partially observable via an output map. Given a
state (fault) partition, the system is defined to be on- line diagnosable if there exists sequence
of commands so that the state of the system, up to the fault partition, can be decided from
the output map. An algorithm for computing such a sequence is given in [67].
Formal language based DES approach
Sampath et al. has proposed a formal language framework for studying diagnosability
properties of un-timed discrete event systems [98][97][95]. The approach is closely related
to the Ramage-Wonham framework for supervisory control of DES [89]. The method has
been applied to HVAC- systems (heating, ventilation and air-condition), but is applicable to
all systems that at some level can be meaningfully modeled as discrete event systems. The
main features of the approach is methods for modeling the normal and faulty behavior of
systems as DES, implementation of online passive diagnosis, and analysis of diagnosability
properties.
Both the normal and faulty behavior of the system to be diagnosed is modeled with a
finite state machine. Components are modeled individually and faults in the components
are modeled as unobservable events. The system model is then put together with the usual
synchronous composition [89]. To include sensor information in the model, global sensor
8
maps from the states of the model to sensor readings are constructed and then included
in the event labels. The diagnostic problem is then to infer about past occurrences of
unobservable fault events from the observable events. A diagnoser that gives a state and
fault estimation of the system after occurrence of each observable event is constructed from
the model. The diagnoser hence is an extended observer.
One of the main features of this approach is the ability to analyze diagnosability prop-
erties. Diagnosability is, the ability to detect and isolate an occurred fault with finite delay
using the observable events. Isolation is performed with respect to a fault partition.
To demand that a fault should always be diagnosed with finite delay is rather strong, and
very few systems can fulfill it. Therefore the notion of I-diagnosability is introduced, which
means that a fault should be detected and, up to a given partition, isolated with finite delay
after a so called indicator event has occurred. Stated in other words, the system has to be
excited enough for the fault to be diagnosed.
If a model of a system is not diagnosable (I-diagnosable), the authors identify two means
of making it diagnosable: i) introduce more sensors and ii) design the controller so that
the faulty behavior is excited and can be detected. The theory is set in a formal language
framework. In [95] and [96], the authors present a method for designing controllers in the
RW-framework that make the system diagnosable. Chen and Provan have extended the
approach to timed discrete event systems [14].
1.2.3 Temporal logic based approach
Temporal logic was originally developed [42] for investigation the manner in which tem-
poral operators are used in natural language arguments. It provides a formal way of quali-
tatively describing and reasoning about how the truth values of assertions change over time.
In [86], first argued that temporal logic is appropriate for reasoning about nonterminating
concurrent programs such as operating systems and network communication protocols. Now
temporal logic is a widely active area of research. It has been used or proposed for use in
virtually all aspects of concurrent program design, including specification, verification, and
mechanical program synthesis.
For the supervisory control and failure diagnosis problem, temporal logic provides an
effective means of specification. In most cases, the translation of a simple natural language
specification into temporal logic one is quite straightforward.
In [47], linear time temporal logic (LTL) is used to express fault specifications for the
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failure diagnosis of DESs. Diagnosability of DESs is defined in the temporal logic setting.
The problem of testing the diagnosability is reduced to that of model checking. Algorithms
for the test of diagnosability and the synthesis of a diagnoser are obtained. The problem of
the failure diagnosis of repeated faults is studied in [49].
This concludes our discussion on approaches to failure diagnosis that have appeared in
the literature. Each of the above methods possesses certain advantages and disadvantages,
and is best applicable under specific circumstances. Which of these approaches one selects
for a given system depends not only on the characteristics of the system and the knowledge
available about the system but also on the nature of the failures one wants to diagnose.
With this background on the importance of the failure diagnosis problem and the various
methodologies to solve this problem, we now proceed on to discussion related to our research.
1.3 Focus of the Research
1.3.1 Application of supervisory control to an assembly line
Modern machining and assembly facilities require a great deal of operational and struc-
tural flexibility owing to the rapidly changing manufacturing environments in which they
exist. The design of controllers for such systems is often an error prone task, since intuitive
methods rather than formal techniques continue to be used. Altering any existing control
code in order to accommodate for changes in the system or the control objective, necessitates
extensive verification to establish whether the control code actually implements the desired
specifications. The theory of supervisory control meets the need of designing the controllers
formally, guaranteeing that the behavior of the controlled system meets the desired control
specifications, while providing maximally permissible controlled behavior. No additional
testing is required to check the correctness of the code as the technique used is guaran-
teed to enforce the specifications. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the supervisory
control theory (SCT) in manufacturing systems, an educational test-bed that simulates an
automated car assembly line has been built using LEGO blocks. Finite automata are used
for modeling operations of the assembly line, and for the specifications that accomplish the
task of successfully completing the assembly repeatedly. Using a set of desired safety and
progress specifications for assembly, we use supervisory control techniques for automatically
deriving a supervisor that enforces the specifications while offering the maximum flexibility
of assembly. Subsequently a controller is extracted from the maximally permissive super-
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visor for the purpose of implementing the control by selecting, when possible, at most one
controllable event from among the ones allowed by the supervisor.
1.3.2 Polynomial test for diagnosis
Failure diagnosis in large and complex systems is a critical task. In the realm of discrete
event systems, Sampath et al. proposed a language based failure diagnosis approach. They
introduced the diagnosability for discrete event systems and gave a method for testing the
diagnosability by first constructing a diagnoser for the system. The complexity of this method
of testing diagnosability is exponential in the number of states of the system and doubly
exponential in the number of failure types. In this dissertation, we give an algorithm for
testing diagnosability that does not construct a diagnoser for the system, and its complexity
is of 4th order in the number of states of the system, 2nd order when system model is
deterministic, and linear in the number of the failure types.
1.3.3 Modeling discrete event systems with faults using a rules
based modeling formalism
Obtaining accurate models of systems which are prone to failures and breakdowns is a
difficult task. We present a methodology which makes the task of modeling failure prone
discrete event systems (DESs) considerably less cumbersome, less error prone, and more
user-friendly. Diagnosis of failures in discrete event systems, as proposed by Sampath et
al. [98], makes use of a language based formulation and requires equivalent automata (state
machine) models of the system. The task of obtaining such a model for DESs is non-trivial
for most practical systems, owing to the fact that the number of states in the commonly used
automata models is exponential in the number of signals and faults. In contrast a model of
a discrete event system, in the rules based modeling formalism proposed in [12], is of size
polynomial in the number of signals and faults. In order to model failures, the signals set
consisting of actuators and sensors is enlarged to include binary valued fault signals, each
signal representing either a non-faulty or a faulty state of a certain type. Addition of new
fault signals requires introduction of new rules for the added fault signal events, and also
modification of the existing rules for non-fault events.
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1.3.4 Diagnosis of discrete event systems in rules based model
using first-order logic
We study diagnosis of discrete event systems (DESs) modeled in the rule-based modeling
formalism to model failure-prone systems. An attractive feature of rule-based model is it’s
compactness (size is polynomial in number of signals). A motivation for the work presented
is to develop failure diagnosis techniques that are able to exploit this compactness. In this
regard, we develop symbolic techniques for testing diagnosability and computing a diagnoser.
Diagnosability test is shown to be an instance of 1st order temporal logic model-checking.
An on-line algorithm for diagnoser synthesis is obtained by using predicates and predicate
transformers.
1.3.5 Rules based modeling of an assembly line and its diagnosis
We study diagnosis of an assembly-line [11] that is modeled in the rules-based modeling
formalism. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the rules-based model and of diagnosis
techniques based on such a model in manufacturing systems, an educational test-bed that
simulates an automated car assembly-line built using LEGO r© blocks is being employed. In
this dissertation we provide a rules-based model of the assembly-line. Next we demonstrate
the diagnosis technique for a rules-based model, that is based on 1st-order temporal logic
model checking [44], by applying it to a part of the assembly-line. When the system is found
to be not diagnosable, we use sensor refinement and sensor augmentation to make the system
diagnosable.
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2 the DESs notation used in the dissertation is explained. We used supervisory
control theory to obtain a supervisor for the miniature factory built out of LEGO blocks at
the University of Kentucky.
In Chapter 3 a polynomial time algorithm for diagnosability of Discrete Event Systems
is provided.
In Chapter 4 we modeled Discrete Event Systems with faults using a rules-based modeling
formalism.
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In Chapter 5 we discussed diagnosis of Discrete Event Systems in rules based model
using First-order logic and present an on-line algorithm for diagnoser synthesis.
In Chapter 6 we model a failure prone assembly line in rules based formalism and discussed
its diagnosis.
Chapter 7 provides conclusions and points out possible directions for future work.
Appendix contains the NuSMV program for mouse-cat example. NuSMV is a software
tool for performing model-checking tests that we use to verify diagnosability.
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Chapter 2
Automated Control Synthesis for an
Assembly Line using Discrete Event
System Control Theory
2.1 Introduction
A significant increase in the level of automation [33] and system complexity has, at the
turn of the century, necessitated the use of methods which do not rely on informal, intuitive
or heuristically designed control programs for real time computers and programmable con-
trollers [72]. Present day controller implementations, even those using specialized logic-based
control languages like Grafcet [1], remain largely based on the expertise and experience of
the designer, rather than on formal control design approaches that have been developed for
discrete event control in recent years. As a result there is no way of ensuring that control
specifications will be met every time in the controlled system. Supervisory control theory
(SCT) proposed by Ramadge-Wonham [88] is particularly well suited for the task of controller
design since the resulting supervisor is always guaranteed to meet the control specifications.
This theory is applicable to any system which evolves in response to events that are sponta-
neous, instantaneous, asynchronous and thus discrete in nature. Such systems are classified
as discrete event system (DES) and have been examined in detail [54, 88].
A DES to be controlled, also called a plant, is modeled by a finite state machine (FSM)
and can equivalently be described by a language model. The specifications which express the
constraints that one wishes to impose on the plant’s behavior are modeled as formal languages
14
as well. A supervisor exercises control over the plant by dynamically disallowing a minimal
set of controllable events so as to achieve the desired specifications. Thus the supervisor is
designed to be maximally permissive as in the supervisory control theory. A controller is
extracted out of the supervisor by selecting, when possible, at most one controllable event
from among the ones allowed by the supervisor. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The steps
(What system can do)
Plant Model
(What system should do)(What system shouldn’t do)
Safety Specification
Specification Model
Automated Control Synthesis
Synthesis
Automated Supervisor
Controller Extraction
Progress Specification
Control Code Generation
Figure 2.1: Discrete event control theory based automated control synthesis
to be followed for designing control programs using supervisory control theory are:
• FSM models of the system to be controlled.
• FSM models of the safety and progress control specifications of the system.
• Use of supervisory control theory to obtain the maximally permissive supervisor for
the system.
• Extraction of a controller from the supervisor, which permits at most one controllable
event to be enabled at each state.
• Translation of the controller into control code or PLC.
Some of the advantages of using SCT for automated control synthesis are as follows:
• Any change in the control specifications can be rapidly translated into executable
control code using the procedure shown in Figure 2.1. The new control specification is
modeled as an FSM and using SCT a new controller can be synthesized.
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• No testing of the control code obtained using SCT is needed, since the method of
construction of these controllers guarantees their correctness. This eliminates the time
spent in checking the code for incorrect or incomplete operation sequences.
• Expensive mechanical safeguards which are installed in the system can be reduced
owing to the fact that unsafe behavior in the system will be avoided when the controllers
are designed using a FSM model based approach provided by SCT.
• The FSMs used for modeling the system and the specifications are intuitive and simple
to construct for moderate size systems.
• Since many manufacturing systems operate in similar configurations, the models de-
veloped for one system can be altered for use in another context. Hence development
time for the generation of control code in a new system can be reduced.
• The supervisor obtained from the automated control synthesis procedure shown in
Figure 2.1, provides the maximum permissible ways of achieving the control objective.
The designer of the system can choose which particular controller to extract out of the
supervisor based on different criteria, such as minimum operation time, cost, or on the
plant layout. At a later time a different controller can be chosen if the design criteria
changes.
• Since the control code can be generated automatically the system designer can work at
an abstracted level, not bothering about the manner or language in which the control
code implementation will be done.
In this dissertation we describe a simple educational test-bed built from LEGO blocks
that simulates an automated car assembly line. The objective is to demonstrate a formal
way of designing a controller for a discrete event plant by applying the theory of supervisory
control. This miniature assembly line performs a very simple assembly of the roof and the
chassis. The two parts are transported to the press section from their respective initial
sections, where a vertical press operation assembles the two parts, and finally the assembled
part exits the assembly line through the unloading section. A transporter links the chassis,
roof, press, and unloading sections.
We present FSM models of each of the individual sections, the composition of which is the
entire plant model. The number of states in transporter, chassis, roof, press, and unloading
sections is 21, 21, 30, 23, and 5 respectively, which implies a total of around 8 × 105 states
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for the entire system. We also provide safety and progress specification models, where safety
specification is needed for the safe operation of the system whereas the progress specification
is needed to achieve the task of assembly. The safety specification is a conjunct of sixteen
sub-specifications, divided into a set of six “global” ones and a set of ten “local” ones. There
is a single progress specification which is obtained by combining four different sub-tasks.
The overall specification is the conjunct of the safety and progress.
The set of input events which control the motor actions forms the set of controllable
events, whereas the set of output events which are generated by the sensors forms the
uncontrollable events set. We do not model failures, and all events are considered to be
observable.
Using the supervisory control theory we obtain the maximally permissive supervisor for
the miniature assembly line that enforces the overall specification. This turns out to be the
automaton represented by the overall specification itself, since the overall specification is
found to be controllable [54, 88]. A controller is extracted out of the supervisor as described
above, and then the controller is translated into specific code understood by the LEGO
Dacta control software.
While setting up the miniature LEGO factory, the one built at the University of Mas-
sachusetts, [10] in 1995 served as a prototype. In another allied work, a train test bed
for controlling the movement of two trains which share three track loops, was built at the
University of Toronto [62], in 1996. An application from the semiconductor industry, for
controlling a Rapid Thermal Multiprocessor and addressing the reliable update of process-
ing recipes, using supervisory control theory (SCT) has been done in [3]. Application of SCT
to manufacturing is considered in [9] wherein movement of pallets carrying parts with dif-
ferent machining sequences required is controlled. Supervisory control has also been applied
for designing supervisors in automated highway systems’ vehicle communication protocols
[41, 108], in protocol conversion [57], in feature interaction in telephony [104], in failure
diagnosis of HVAC systems in [99].
This rest of the chaper is organized as follows: In section 2 the notations used for modeling
DESs are introduced. Section 3 outlines the working of the LEGO factory and FSM models
of the same are presented in section 4. Section 5 contains descriptions as well as the FSM
models of the safety specifications, and Section 6 does the same for progress specifications.
In section 7 a supervisor is synthesized from which a controller is extracted for the LEGO
factory, and finally in section 8 scope for future extensions as part of ongoing research is
17
outlined.
2.2 Notation and Preliminaries
We use Σ to denote the finite set of events over which a DES evolves. A concatenation
of finite number of events forms a string of events or a trace. A language is a collection of
traces. Let Σ∗ be the set of all strings (traces) of events of Σ including the empty string ². A
language is thus a subset of Σ∗. For a language H, the notation H, called the prefix closure
of H, is the set of all prefixes of traces in H. H is said to be prefix closed if H = H.
Abstractly, a discrete event system can also be viewed as a 5-tuple state machine
G = (X,Σ, δ, x0, Xm),
where X is the set of states, Σ is the set of events, δ : X × Σ → X is the partial state
transition function, x0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and Xm ⊆ X is the set of marked or final
states. The generated behavior of the discrete event system modeled by G is described by
its generated language:
L(G) := {s ∈ Σ∗|δ(s, x0) is defined},
where by induction the transition function has been extended from events to traces δ :
X × Σ∗ → X. The generated language of G is the set of all traces that it can execute
starting from its initial state. The marked language of G contains those generated traces
which terminate in a final state and signify task completion:
Lm(G) := {s ∈ L(G) | δ(s, x0) ∈ Xm}.
Synchronous composition [36] of state machines is used to represent the concurrent be-
havior of two DESs. Given two deterministic state machines S1 := (X1,Σ1, δ1, x0,1, Xm,1) and
S2 := (X2,Σ2, δ2, x0,2, Xm,2), composition of S1 and S2 denoted S1‖S2 := (X,Σ, δ, x0, Xm),
is defined as: X := X1 × X2, Σ := Σ1 ∪ Σ2, x0 := (x0,1, x0,2), Xm := Xm,1 × Xm,2, and for
each x = (x1, x2) ∈ X and σ ∈ Σ:
δ(x, σ) :=


(δ1(x1, σ), δ2(x2, σ)) if δ1(x1, σ), δ2(x2, σ) defined, σ ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2
(δ1(x1, σ), x2) if δ1(x1, σ) defined, σ ∈ Σ1 − Σ2
(x1, δ2(x2, σ)) if δ2(x2, σ) defined, σ ∈ Σ2 − Σ1
undefined otherwise
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So when S1 and S2 are composed, the common events occur synchronously, while the other
events occur asynchronously. Note that when Σ1 = Σ2 = Σ, then L(S1‖S2) = L(S1)∩L(S2)
and Lm(S1‖S2) = Lm(S1) ∩ Lm(S2) since all events must occur synchronously.
The set of plant events is partitioned into two disjoint sets Σc, the set of all controllable
events, and Σu, the set of all uncontrollable events. A controllable event is one which can
be allowed to occur or prevented from possibly occurring by an external agent, whereas no
such control is possible for an uncontrollable event.
In general, a supervisor determines the set of events to be disabled after each transition
based on the observed sequence of events. A supervisor, denoted S, is a map S : L(G) →
2Σ−Σu that determines the set of events S(s) ⊆ (Σ−Σu) to be disabled after the occurrence of
trace s ∈ L(G). Events not belonging to the set S(s) remain enabled at trace s. In particular,
the uncontrollable events remain enabled. A supervisor thus restricts the behavior of the
plant. Since synchronous composition also results in behavior restrictions, the action of
control may also be achieved by taking a synchronous composition of plant automaton G
and supervisor automaton S. This is represented by the automaton G‖S. Since S must
never prevent any feasible uncontrollable event from happening, the following should hold:
L(G‖S)Σu ∩ L(G) ⊆ L(G‖S), in which case S is said to be Σu-enabling [54]. Further, S is
said to be non-blocking if L(G‖S) ⊆ Lm(G‖S), i.e., if each generated trace of the controlled
plant can be extended to be a marked trace of the controlled plant.
It is known from supervisory control theory [88] that given a discrete event plant G
and a desired nonempty specification language K ⊆ Lm(G), there exists a Σu-enabling and
nonblocking supervisor S such that Lm(G‖S) = K if and only if K is controllable and
relative-closed with respect to G, i.e,
KΣu ∩ L(G) ⊆ K, and K ∩ Lm(G) ⊆ K.
Controllability means execution of an arbitrary prefix of K, say s, followed by an uncontrol-
lable event σ; such that sσ is possible in the plant; implies that sσ is also in the prefix of
K. This is because the occurrence of uncontrollable events cannot be prevented. Relative-
closure means that any prefix of K that is marked by the plant must itself be in K. This is
because the marking status of a trace is determined by the plant.
If K is controllable with respect to L(G) then the synchronous composition of the au-
tomata representing K and L(G) is the required supervisor, but if this is not the case. then
one computes the language K↑, the supremal controllable and relative-closed sublanguage of
K with respect to G [116, 55].
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A controller we design, further restricts the behavior of the plant under maximally per-
missive supervision, with the property that it permits the execution of only one controllable
event following each trace, whenever at at least one such event is possible following that
trace. A controller is defined to be a mapping, C : K↑ → Σc ∪ {²}:
∀s ∈ K↑ :


C(s) 6= {²} if (K↑\s) ∩ Σc 6= Φ
C(s) = {²} otherwise
As with a supervisor, the uncontrollable events remain enabled.
2.3 Example: Control of a LEGO transporter
For the sake of illustration of SCT, we first present a simpler example of a LEGO r© trans-
porter system. In subsequent sections, the FSM modeling and supervisory control of the
test-bed LEGO r© factory are provided. A transporter, shown in Figure 2.2, moves between
home and extended positions, crossing a number of intermediary positions. An angle sensor,
Home position
rack
Gearbox motor
Position 0 Position 1
pinion
angle sensor 
Extended position
A1
M1
TRANSPORTERFIXTURE
Figure 2.2: Schematic of the transporter
A1, is used to determine when the transporter is either in the extended, f, intermediate, a,g,
or the home position, l. The forward and reverse direction motor commands are Ifon and
Iron respectively, while the corresponding stop commands are Ifof and Irof.
An automaton model of the system is constructed by considering all possible sequence of
events possible in the plant starting from the initial state. We assume that the initial state
of the system is when all the actuators are off (Irof, Ifof) and the transporter is in retracted
position (l). In the initial state the controllable events Ifon, and Iron, are possible. Ifon
will cause the transporter to leave the home position in the forward direction and enter the
intermediary position, a. On the other hand, the Iron command will not change the position
of the transporter as it already is in the home position. In this way the automaton model is
constructed by considering all possibile events, at all the possible states reachable from the
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initial state. In the FSM models controllable transitions are indicated by a short line drawn
across the transitions. Filled circles in the FSM models represent marked or acceptable
behavior of the system. The FSM model of the transporter system is shown in Figure 2.3.
l
V4V3V2
Ifon
Ifof
a
IfofIfonIfofIfon
Iron
Irof
Iron
Irof
Iron
Irof
Home 
position position
Extended
V6V7
V1
V8
V5V9
g
f
Figure 2.3: Overall FSM model of the transporter
2.3.1 Specification Models
Safety specifications are concerned with the safe operation of the plant and must be enforced
regardless of what task the plant is performing. The progress specification is used to spec-
ify the specific task the plant needs to perform. Since the prefixes of safe operations must
themselves be safe, safety specifications are prefix closed. In contrast, the progress specifi-
cations are non-prefix closed. The safety specifications for the model is shown in Figure 2.4,
which indicate that when the transporter reaches the extended position the forward motor
should no longer be kept on, and similarly when the transporter reaches the home position
the reverse motor should not be kept on. The progress specification is also shown in Fig-
c c c c
ccc
c
gfa l
c
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5
a f
gl S2S1 S3
−Ifon−Iron
Progress Specification
: Set of controllable events: Ifon, Ifof, Iron, Irof
Safety Specification
Σ Σ Σ Σ
ΣΣΣ
Σ
Σ
Figure 2.4: Safety and Progress specification FSM models
ure 2.4, wherein the transporter should commence movement from the home position, travel
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until the extended position and return to home, whence all movement should be turned off
permanently, i.e., the cycle should not be repeated.
2.3.2 Supervisor Synthesis and Controller Extraction
l
Ifon
a
Ifof
Irof Irof
Home 
position position
Extended
g
f
R1
R2 R3 R5
R6
R7R8R10
Irof
R11
l
Ifon
Ifof
a
IfofIfofIfon
Iron
Irof
Iron
Irof
Home 
position position
Extended
g
f
R1
R2 R3 R5
R6
R7R8
R9
R4
R10
Irof
R11
Supervisor for Transporter System
Controller for Transporter System
Figure 2.5: Supervisor and Controller FSM models
An overall FSM model of the specifications is first obtained by taking a synchronous
composition of the safety and progress specifications, yielding a combined specification having
5 states. For computing a supervisor, we use the DES software toolkit, and this yields a
supervisor for the transporter system having 11 states. The supervisor and one of the possible
candidate controllers is shown in Figure 2.5. Note that at any stage of the assembly process
the controller enables at most one controllable event.
2.4 Description of LEGO Assembly Line
This miniature assembly line simulates the conditions under which actual automobile
assembly take place, and involves: motors which drive mechanisms which in turn cause the
assembly of the roof-chassis to take place; a transporter to move the semi-finished product
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through various stages of the assembly; and sensors which bring back the status of the present
plant conditions to the LEGO DACTA controller.
The pieces to be assembled are shown in Figure 2.6. The miniature factory is made
ROOF
CHASSIS
After  Pressing  OperationBefore  Pressing  Operation
Figure 2.6: Partially assembled car
entirely out of LEGO blocks and contains 8 sensors and 9 motors, also provided by LEGO.
The factory layout required for implementing this, and to provide for material handling and
storage capabilities is given in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Schematic of the plant layout
The factory is controlled by one personal computer, which is interfaced with the assembly-
line through a LEGO Control Lab Interface Box. This interface box has 8 sensor
inputs, four of which accommodate passive (binary) sensors viz. touch; while the other four
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accommodate active (continuous valued) sensors viz. light or angle. Touch sensors return
a value of boolean value when depressed, indicating their logic status. Light sensors return
the light intensity reflected into the sensor’s detector, either as a percentage or as a raw
number. Angle sensors which are always connected to a rotating axle, report either the
angle in degrees or the number of revolutions turned.
In addition to sensor inputs, the interface box also provides eight motor outputs. The
power and directions of the motors, as well as the overall logic of the plant can be controlled
through the Control Lab Software which is written in a special version of the “Logo” pro-
gramming language, called Control lab. Complete control of the operations involved in
the assembly is done through this MS-WINDOWS based software. In our setting, control
of the plant is done using LEGO commands obtained from the controller designed using
supervisory control.
The capability of the system under investigation is quite extensive and we limit it by
imposing certain restrictions which are as follows:
• We do not change the speed of any of the motors without first stopping them, even
though this is possible through the software. Also if the direction of the motors have
to be changed then they are brought to a stop prior to being enabled for rotation in
the opposite direction.
• Owing to the limitations in the number of sensors available to us, for the purpose of
control of the model, we do not use the events which correspond to the operation of
either of the loaders, or to that of the unloading conveyor. Instead we work with the
information available to us, and assume the occurrence of events which imply other
events. For example, the departure of the unloading pusher from its retracted position
and its subsequent return imply that if a loaded fixture was present at the unloading
section then that part has been offloaded. Note that although such situation can be
handled by the SCT with partial observation [66], but that is beyond the scope of the
present study.
• We assume that the parts are loaded only when the conveyers are stationary.
• We do not consider the case of motor or sensor failures.
• The controllable events in the system are assumed to be disabled unless explicitly
enabled.
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• We start our system assuming the transporter is referenced, i.e., A5 reads 0 rotations,
all the motors are off, touch sensors indicating the chassis T2, roof T3 & unloading L8
light sensor pushers are retracted, i.e., “On”, and that the roof press touch sensor T4
is raised. Refer to Figure 2.7.
2.5 Plant Models
The plant is modeled using deterministic FSM models. Instead of having a single incom-
prehensible model for the system, and to make FSM designing simpler, we develop smaller
sized sub-models of the system. The entire system is partitioned into different sections and
models are developed for each section separately. Thus the intricacies of having a large model
is avoided, and the time of development required for the smaller models is substantially less.
The plant model is composed of individual models for the transporter, chassis, roof, press
and unloading sections. Since it is the transporter that co-ordinates the entire assembly
process, the primary model of the system as a whole is developed around it. It is implicit
in all the models that those events that do not appear in the FSM of the particular section,
appear as self-loops on all the states. Self-loops are just a way of indicating that the current
state of this particular section is in no way affected by the occurrence of that event in some
other section. To obtain the overall behavior of the plant, a strict synchronous operation of
the different subsections is taken.
The actuator & sensor signals and their events used for modeling the plant are given in
Figure 6.1. Each state in the plant model can potentially be one of the final states, which
indicates completion of specific tasks. This fact is shown in the plant FSM models by using
filled circles to mark the states. In order to determine which of the states is a final state,
the progress specifications, described in Section 2.7, are used, as shown later in Section 2.8.
Progress specifications determine the markings on the plant model.
2.5.1 Transporter (Fixture Slide)
This forms the backbone of the entire assembly line. Parts are transported from one
assembly section to another via the transport mechanism, which essentially consists of a
fixture that is connected to one end of a rack that is moved by a pinion powered from a
gear box motor, M1. An angle sensor, A5, mounted on the same shaft as that of the
pinion, counts off the number of rotations of the axle through it, in order to determine the
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position of the fixture. The FSM model of the transporter is given in Figure 6.2. Initially the
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Figure 2.9: Transporter FSM model
transporter in the home position V1 (refer Figure 6.2). It can either be switched on in the
forward or reverse directions by the action of motor events Ifon and Iron respectively. Since
from the home position only forward movement is possible, the motor event Ifon results in
sensor event a indicating that the slide has left the home position. Proceeding in this fashion
we model the movement of the slide until it reaches the chassis section. This is denoted by
the sensor event f. At this state (V8), the forward movement can be switched off with the
motor event (Ifof) bringing the system to state V9. Other states in the transporter FSM can
be obtained by tracing out the actuator-sensor event flow for this section.
2.5.2 Chassis
The chassis conveyor conveys parts to its docking area. The chassis dock acts as a buffer
with a capacity of one part. Parts are pushed off the dock by a chassis pusher, onto the
empty fixture attached to the transporter. Sensors monitor the retracted position of the
pusher and presence of part on the dock. The FSM models of the chassis section operations
is given in Figure 2.10. It consists of two automata models. A 15 state automata shows the
behavior of the plant events in the chassis section. An additional 2 state automata is shown
to indicate that, owing to mechanical considerations, it is not possible for the chassis pusher
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to advance unless the transporter slide with the fixture is stationed in front of the chassis
station’s loading dock.
2.5.3 Roof
The roof conveyor conveys parts that are loaded on it, onto the roof dock which also has
a buffer size of one. A part is pushed off the dock onto an waiting transporter by the roof
pusher. Sensors monitor the retracted position of the pusher and presence of part on the
dock. The FSM model of the roof section operations is given in Figure 2.10.
2.5.4 Press
The pressing of the roof and the chassis is done by releasing a weighted LEGO block onto
a properly positioned transporter carrying the roof-chassis combination. The mechanism is
controlled by a press pusher and Winding motor. Initially the pusher is advanced so that
the weighted block is suspended at a certain height. When the pusher retracts the weight
descends and presses the pieces together. After this the pusher is advanced again so as
to mesh with the winding motor gears, which when switched on raises the block up again.
The retracted position of the pusher and the raised position of the block are monitored by
sensors. The FSM model of the press section operations is given in Figure 2.11.
2.5.5 Unloading
The unloading conveyor conveys parts that are pushed onto it by the unloading pusher.
There is a sensor for monitoring the retracted position of the pusher. The FSM model of
the unloading section is given in Figure 2.11. consists of two automata. The behavior of the
unloading section is modeled by the four state automata. Owing to mechanical considerations
it is not possible for the unloading pusher to advance unless the transporter slide with the
fixture is stationed in front of the unloading station’s loading dock. This is indicated by the
2 state automata in Figure 2.11.
2.6 Safety Specification Models
Since the safe operation of the plant is mainly concerned with the safe enabling of con-
trollable events, many of the models are drawn considering a particular output being on or
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off, and whether some other transition can be safely turned on under that condition. There
are a total of sixteen safety specifications for the entire plant model. Six of them are related
to multiple sections, and hence are called global specifications. The remaining ten are related
to the safety required for the operation of individual sections, and hence are called local.
2.6.1 Global Safety Specifications
Many of the specifications require interactions between the transporter and the different
sections of the assembly line. For the purpose of modeling it is convenient to group many of
the uncontrollable transporter events listed in Figure 2.12.
The 6 global safety specifications for the plant are enumerated next and their FSM models
are given in Figure 2.12:
1. Global safety specification 1, K1 (Figure 2.12)
This model pertains to the chassis section and to the transporter. The chassis pusher
M3 should not advance if the transporter is not at the chassis section i.e. A5 = 80.
2. Global safety specification 2, K2 (Figure 2.12)
This model pertains to the roof section and to the transporter. The roof pusher M5
should not advance if the transporter is not at the roof section i.e. A5 = 52.
3. Global safety specification 3, K3 (Figure 2.12)
This model pertains to the press section and to the transporter. The transporter M1
should not move if the press is lowered i.e. T4 off.
4. Global Safety specification 4, K4 (Figure 2.12)
This model pertains to the unloading section and to the transporter. The unloading
pusherM8 should not advance if the transporter is not in the home/unloading position
A5 = 0.
5. Global safety specification 5, K5 (Figure 2.12)
This model pertains to the press section and to the transporter. The press pusherM6
should not move back if the transporter is not under the press section A5 = 21.
6. Global safety specification 6, K6a,K6b (Figure 2.12)
This model pertains to the press section, the unloading section and to the transporter.
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The transporter M1 should not move unless the retracted signals from the chassis
pusher T2 and the unload pusher L8 are received.
2.6.2 Local Safety Specifications
There are ten such specifications, 3 for the chassis and the roof each, and 2 for the press
and the transporter each. The FSM models for these specifications are given in Figure 2.13.
1. Local safety specification 1, K7 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the chassis section. If the chassis pusher T2 is not retracted, the
chassis conveyorM2 cannot be switched on, and the chassis pusherM3 be prevented
from turning off.
2. Local safety specification 2, K8 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the chassis section. If the chassis pusher motor M3 is on, the
chassis conveyor M2 may not be switched on and vice versa.
3. Local safety specification 3, K9 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the chassis section. If there is a part on the chassis dock L6,
then the chassis conveyor M2 should be switched off. On the other hand when there
is no part on the dock then the chassis pusher M3 should not be switched on.
4. Local safety specification 4, K10 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the roof section. If the roof pusher T3 is not retracted, the
chassis conveyor M4 cannot be switched on, and the roof pusher M5 be prevented
from turning off.
5. Local safety specification 5, K11 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the roof section. If the roof pusher motor M5 is on, the roof
conveyor M4 may not be switched on and vice versa.
6. Local safety specification 6, K12 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the roof section. If there is a part on the roof dock L7, then
the roof conveyorM4 should be switched off. On the other hand when there is no part
on the dock then the chassis pusher M5 should not be switched on.
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Figure 2.13: Local safety specifications, K7−K16
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7. Local safety specification 7, K13 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the press section. If the press pusher motorM6 is on in either
direction, the press winding motor M7 may not be switched on and vice versa.
8. Local safety specification 8, K14 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the press section. The winding motor M7 should be stopped
if the press up signal T4 exists.
9. Local safety specification 9, K15 (Figure 2.13)
Backward motion of the referenced transporterM1 is not permitted if the angle sensor
readsA5 0 rotations, i.e., when it is in its initial state. This pertains to the transporter.
10. Local safety specification 10, K16 (Figure 2.13)
This model pertains to the transporter. Forward movement of of the referenced trans-
porter M1 is not permitted if the angle sensor reads A5 80 rotations, i.e., it is at the
chassis section.
2.7 Progress Specification Models
The progress specification is specific to a particular product being assembled, and es-
sentially requires a certain order of uncontrollable events to be followed. For the present
example this governs the way in which the assembly of the automobile is done in the plant.
It is represented by the specification language K17.
The overall task is broken down into the cyclic execution of the four subtasks:
• Move the transporter to the chassis section and start chassis operations (sub-task ST1).
• Move the transporter to the roof section and start roof operations (sub-task ST2).
• Move the transporter to the press section and start roof operations (sub-task ST3).
• Move the transporter to the unloading section and start unloading operations (sub-task
ST4).
Refer to Figure 2.14 for the procedure followed in the assembly line under this progress
specification.
The progress specification has only one state marked, the initial one, indicating that the
final and initial positions are the same and that the cycle can repeat indefinitely.
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ST1 : sub-task related to chassis assembly line activity
ST2 : sub-task related to roof assembly line activity
ST3 : sub-task related to press assembly line activity
ST4 : sub-task related to unloading assembly line activity
self loops in the progress specification machines  ST1-ST4
Legend:  dCup: o/p event for part present on the chassis section’s dock Legend:  dRdn: o/p event for part present on the roof station’s dock
Legend:  pUup: output event for pusher retracted at the unloading section
Figure 2.14: Global progress specification, K17, and sub-tasks ST1− ST4
Next we present the individual sub-task specification models.
1. Sub-Task 1
Refer to Figure 2.14 for the progress specifications which is related to the chassis section
wherein the chassis conveyor starts causing a part to be delivered to the chassis dock.
The chassis pusher then comes on, delivering the part to the fixture attached to the
transporter. The chassis section needs to perform the following sequence of operations:
• Wait for the transporter to reach the chassis section (f).
• Wait until light sensor L6 turns on (dCup), indicating part on dock.
• Wait until when sensor T2 turns on (pCup), indicating chassis pusher back.
2. Sub-Task 2
Refer to Figures 2.14 for the progress specifications which is related to the roof section
wherein the roof conveyor starts causing a part to be delivered to the roof dock. The
roof pusher then comes on delivering the part to the waiting transporter’s fixture. The
roof section needs to perform the following sequence of operations:
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• Wait for the transporter to reach the roof section (h).
• Wait until light sensor L7 turns off (dRdn), indicating part on dock.
• Wait until when sensor T3 turns on (pRup), indicating roof pusher back.
3. Sub-Task 3
Refer to Figures 2.14, for the progress specifications which is related to the press section
wherein the press pusher retracts causing the press to descend. Immediately after that
the press pusher advances, and engages with the winding motor. The winding motor
stars up and the press is raised the top position being sensed by a sensor. The press
section needs to perform the following sequence of operations:
• Wait for the transporter to reach the press section (j).
• Wait for sensor T1 to be turn on (pPup).
• Wait for T4 to turn on, indicating that the press is raised (wPup).
4. Sub-Task 4
Refer to Figure 2.14 for the progress specifications which is related to the unloading
section wherein the unloading conveyor starts causing a part delivered to be the staging
area. The unloading section needs to perform the following sequence of operations:
• Wait for the transporter to reach the unloading section (l).
• Wait until light sensor L8 turn on (pUup), indicating part on dock.
Remark 1 The progress specifications may vary for different possible objectives for which
the plant is being used (the desired flow of operations in different sections and for the system
as a whole will vary). Thus, for example, instead of making an automobile, we may instead
choose to do a simple transport activity. This would cause the progress specifications to be
altered, even though the previous safety specifications will still needed to be enforced.
2.8 Supervisor Synthesis and Controller Extraction
For the purpose of supervisor synthesis, each of the plant sub-models is first completed with
respect to the entire alphabet of the system. This is done by adding self-loops on those
transitions that do not exist is a particular sub-machine, but are present in the alphabet
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of the plant. Next a synchronous composition of these sub-models is taken yielding a state
space for the plant models of size around 8×105. On proceeding in a similar fashion with the
specification models we obtain their size to be that of comparable order as that of the plant.
For computing a supervisor, we use the supervisory control toolkit available at the University
of Kentucky (www.engr.uky.edu/∼kumar). The overall safe and progress specification is
determined to be controllable, and relative-closed and hence the overall specification FSM
serves as the maximally permissive supervisor.
In order to manage the computational complexity, we use a modular approach to ver-
ify the controllability and relative-closure of the intersection of all safety (K1 − K16) and
progress (K17) specifications. First we verify the controllability of individual safety spec-
ifications against the relevant portions of the plant. For example, the first local safety
specification K7 concerns the operation of the chassis section. So we verify its controlla-
bility against the model of the chassis section only, which as shown in Figure 2.10 has 30
states. Since K7 has 2 states, the complexity of this verification is O(60). Proceeding in
a similar fashion the controllability of other local safety specifications is verified. Next, for
each global safety specification which involves more than one section, we use the synchronous
composition of the FSM models of the relevant sections as the plant model and reform the
controllability test. For example, the plant model for the sixth global safety specification K6
comprises of the synchronous composition of the FSM models of the chassis, the transporter,
and the unloading sections. Finally, since the individual safety specifications are controllable
and prefix closed we conclude that their intersection is also controllable and prefix closed.
It remains to verify the controllability and relative-closure of the progress specification
K17, and its non-conflictingness with respect to the intersection of all the safety specifications
K := ∩16i=1Ki. Since the plant marking is determined solely by the progress specification,
Lm(G) := K17 ∩ L(G). Then we have
K17 ∩ Lm(G) = K17 ∩K17 ∩ L(G) ⊆ K17,
i.e., K17 is relative-closed. We establish the controllability of K17 by viewing it as a cyclical
concatenation of the four sub-tasks. The first sub-task starts in the initial state of the
plant and upon completion sends the plant to a final state, which can be treated as the
initial state of the second sub-task. We verify the controllability of each of the subtasks
against the relevant portion of the plant which is appropriately initialized and terminated.
This let us perform the controllability test of the progress specification modularly, where
modularity stems from the sequential (as opposed to parallel) decomposition of the progress
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specification.
Next we establish that the intersection of the safety specifications K and the progress
specification K17 is non-conflicting. We observe that the progress specification never vio-
lates any of the safety, i.e., K17 ⊆ K = K, which also implies K17 ⊆ K = K. These
automatically give us the non-conflictingness property since,
K17 ∩K = K17 = K17 ∩K.
Finally we are interested in obtaining a controller for the supervised plant. One particular
controller candidate, having 49 states, is shown in Figure 2.15. It is obtained by selecting at
most one controllable event, when possible, from among the ones allowed by the maximally
permissive supervisor. Note that at any stage of the assembly process the controller enables
at most one actuator (controllable) event to occur, and then waits for the response of the
system in the form of a sensor (uncontrollable) event. This procedure is repeated until the
task specified by the progress specification is completed while always following operating in
the safe region.
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Figure 2.15: Controller for LEGO assembly line
The controller chosen for implementation is translated into LEGO commands in a direct
way, as there exists a one-to-one correspondence between plant events and the actuator
commands to be executed or the sensor inputs to be monitored. A portion of the control
lab code corresponding to Figure 2.15, is provided as reference. Only in those places where
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a controllable event needs to be enabled is the control lab code inserted. Those states in the
FSM where only uncontrollable events occur and have no controllable transitions leading out
of them need no additional action to be enabled by the controller. So, for example, when the
transporter is moving from the home/unloading section to the chassis section it monitors the
occurrence of events corresponding to its crossing the press and roof sections but does not
take any other action than monitor them. This is illustrated in the following Lego control
code fragment.
to main ; call the control program
tto "M1 ; reference M1, the transporter motor
setright ; set direction of movement ("Ifon")
on ; turn motor on
waituntil [A5=80] off ; monitor value of A5, the angle sensor at
; until it reaches 80 ("f") at chassis,
; section, then stop motor M1 ("Ifof")
.
.
.
launch[main] ; restart the control program for
; cyclic operation
end ; end of the control program
We choose a control scheme wherein for those states of the FSM where both a controllable
and uncontrollable event are permitted to occur, and if the controllable event is such that its
execution at this state will prohibit the occurrence of the uncontrollable event at any further
state we choose to execute the controllable one, rather than wait for the uncontrollable
one to occur. Such a case occurs in the Lego system while the transporter moves between
different section and we are able to control its movement its position precisely by switching
it off. Given the time constants in the system it is thus feasible to effectively pre-empt the
occurrence of uncontrollable events in some states.
The software has capability of switching outputs on and off; waiting until a variable has
reached certain boolean values prior to executing a command; certain amount of multitasking
for launching sub-processes that will run in the background; and repetitions of a desired task
sequences.
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2.9 Conclusion
Implementation of the supervisory control theory for control of a miniature assembly line
built from LEGO blocks, has been carried out. The controller so derived is by its construction
guaranteed to be safe in operation, while also ensuring that the task for which it has been
constructed will be accomplished.
Any change in the system such as addition or removal of equipment and the expansion
of system operations to include new products types, can be easily incorporated by drawing
new FSM models of the specific components of the plant and changing the relevant safety,
progress specifications finite state machine models. Then, using supervisory control theory,
a new supervisor can be synthesized, and a controller extracted from it. This approach is a
generic one and can be applied to discrete event systems which are modeled as FSMs.
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Chapter 3
Polynomial Time Diagnosis Algorithm
for DESs
3.1 Introduction
Failure diagnosis is a critical task in large and complex systems. This problem has
received considerable attention in the literature of various domains including the discrete
event systems [14, 39, 67, 98, 93, 111]. In [98], Sampath et al. proposed a failure diagnosis
approach for discrete event systems. They introduced the notion of diagnosability and gave
a necessary and sufficient condition for testing it. Their condition is expressed as a property
of the diagnoser of the system. In order to test the diagnosability, the diagnoser needs to be
constructed first. The complexity of constructing the diagnoser and testing the diagnosability
is exponential in the number of states of the system and doubly exponential in the number
of failure types.
It is clear that if we could test more efficiently whether or not a system is diagnosable
without having to construct a diagnoser, it would save us the time involved in constructing
a diagnoser for the system which may not be diagnosable. In this chapter, we give a method
for testing the diagnosability without having to construct a diagnoser. The complexity of
our method is polynomial in the number of states of the system and also in the number of
failure types.
In the rest of the chapter, we first introduce the notion of diagnosability of discrete
event systems, then present our algorithm for testing it. Finally, an illustrative example is
provided.
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3.2 Diagnosability
We first give the system model and then define the diagnosability as introduced by [98].
3.2.1 System model
Let G = (X,Σ, δ, x0) be a finite state machine model of the system to be diagnosed,
where
• X is a finite set of states;
• Σ is a finite set of event labels;
• δ ⊆ X × Σ×X is a finite set of transitions;
• x0 ∈ X is the initial state.
We assume that all state machines are accessible (all states can be reached from the initial
state), and otherwise we consider only the accessible part of the state machine. We let Σ∗
denote the set of all finite length event sequences, including the zero length sequence denoted
². An element of Σ∗ is called a trace, and a subset of Σ∗ is called a language. For a trace s
and an event σ, we write σ ∈ s to imply that σ is an event contained in the trace s. A path
in G is a sequence of transitions (x1, σ1, x2, . . . , σn, xn) such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
(xi, σi, xi+1) ∈ δ; this path is a cycle if xn = x1. We use L(G) ⊆ Σ
∗ to denote the generated
language of G, i.e., the set of traces that can be executed in G starting from its initial state.
Then L(G) is prefix-closed, i.e., L(G) = pr(L(G)), where pr(L(G)) = {u|∃v ∈ Σ∗, uv ∈
L(G)} is the set of prefixes of traces in L(G). Let Σo ⊆ Σ denote the set of observable
events, Σuo = Σ−Σo be the set of unobservable events, M : Σ→ Σo∪{²} be the observation
mask, F = {Fi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m} be the set of failure types, ψ : Σ → F ∪ {∅} be the failure
assignment function for each event in Σ. The definition of M is extended from Σ to Σ∗
inductively as follows: M(²) = ² and for each s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ :M(sσ) =M(s)M(σ).
We make the following assumptions as in [98] for the system studied in this chapter.
A1 The language L(G) generated by G is live. This means that there is a transition defined
at each state x in X.
A2 There does not exist in G any cycle of unobservable events, i.e., (∃k ∈ N) (∀ust ∈
L(G), s ∈ Σ∗uo) ⇒ ||s|| ≤ k, where N denotes the set of natural numbers, and ||s||
denotes the length of trace s.
43
A3 Every failure event is unobservable, i.e., (∀σ ∈ Σ, ψ(σ) 6= ∅)⇒M(σ) = ².
3.2.2 Diagnosability
The diagnosability for discrete event systems defined in [98] is described as follows:
Definition 1 A prefix-closed language L is said to be diagnosable with respect to the ob-
servation mask M and the failure assignment function ψ if the following holds:
(∀Fi ∈ F) (∃ni ∈ N) (∀s ∈ L, ψ(sf ) = Fi) (∀v = st ∈ L, ||t|| ≥ ni)
⇒ (∀w ∈ L,M(w) =M(v)) (∃u ∈ pr({w}), ψ(uf ) = Fi),
where sf and uf denote the last events in traces s and u respectively, pr({w}) is the set of
all prefixes of w. A system G is said to be diagnosable if its language L(G) is diagnosable.
The above definition states that if s is a trace in L ending with a Fi-type failure, and v
is a sufficient long (at least ni events longer) trace obtained by extending s in L, then every
trace w in L that is observation equivalent to v, i.e., M(w) = M(v), should contain in it a
Fi-type failure.
3.3 Algorithm
We now present the algorithm for testing the diagnosability.
Algorithm 1 For a given system G = (X,Σ, δ, x0) with an observation mask M and a
failure assignment function ψ, do the following:
1. Obtain a nondeterministic finite state machine Go = (Xo,Σo, δo, x
o
0) with language
L(Go) =M(L(G)) as follows:
• Xo = {(x, f) | x ∈ X1 ∪ {x0}, f ⊆ F} is the finite set of states, where X1 = {x ∈
X | ∃(x′, σ, x) ∈ δ with M(σ) 6= ²} is the set of states in G that can be reached
through an observable transition, and f is the set of failure types along certain
paths from x0 to x.
• Σo, the set of observable events, is the set of event labels for Go.
• δo ⊆ Xo × Σo × Xo is the set of transitions. ((x, f), σ, (x
′, f ′)) ∈ δo if and only
if there exists a path (x, σ1, x1, . . . , σn, xn, σ, x
′) (n ≥ 0) in G such that ∀i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n},M(σi) = ², M(σ) = σ, and f
′ = {ψ(σi) | ψ(σi) 6= ∅, 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ f .
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• xo0 = (x0, ∅) ∈ Xo is the initial state.
2. Compute Gd = (Go||Go), the strict composition of Go with itself. Then
Gd = (Xd,Σo, δd, x
d
0), where
• Xd = {(x
o
1, x
o
2) | x
o
1, x
o
2 ∈ Xo} is the set of states.
• Σo is the set of event labels for Gd.
• δd ⊆ Xd × Σo ×Xd is the set of transitions. ((x
o
1, x
o
2), σ, (y
o
1, y
o
2)) ∈ δd if and only
if both (xo1, σ, y
o
1) and (x
o
2, σ, y
o
2) are in δo.
• xd0 = (x
o
0, x
o
0) ∈ Xd is the initial state.
3. Check whether there exists in Gd a cycle cl = (x1, σ1, x2, . . . , xn, σn, x1), n ≥ 1, xi =
((x1i , f
1
i ), (x
2
i , f
2
i )), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, such that f
1
1 6= f
2
1 . If the answer is yes, then output
that the system is not diagnosable; otherwise output that the system is diagnosable.
This last step can be performed by first identifying states ((x1, f 1), (x2, f 2)) in Gd for
which f 1 6= f 2, and deleting all the other states and the associated transitions; and
next checking if the remainder graph contains a cycle.
In the following, we give two Lemmas showing some properties of the state machines Go
and Gd derived in Algorithm 1. The proofs are omitted here because they follow directly
from the definitions of Go and Gd.
Lemma 1 For the state machine Go the following holds:
1. L(Go) =M(L(G)).
2. For every path tr in Go ending with a cycle,
tr = ((x0, ∅), σ0, (x1, f1), . . . , (xk, fk), σk, . . . , (xn, fn), σn, (xk, fk)),
we have
• fi = fj for any i and j in {k, k + 1, . . . , n}.
• ∃uv∗ ∈ L(G) such that M(u) = σ0 . . . σk−1, M(v) = σk . . . σn, and
{ψ(σ) | σ ∈ u, ψ(σ) 6= ∅} = {ψ(σ) | σ ∈ uv, ψ(σ) 6= ∅} = fk.
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Lemma 2 For every path tr in Gd ending with a cycle,
tr = (xd0, σ0, x1, . . . , xk, σk, . . . , xn, σn, xk),
xi = ((x
1
i , f
1
i ), (x
2
i , f
2
i )), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have
1. there exist two paths tr1 and tr2 in Go ending with cycles, namely,
tr1 = ((x0, ∅), σ0, (x
1
1, f
1
1 ), . . . , (x
1
k, f
1
k ), σk, . . . , (x
1
n, f
1
n), σn, (x
1
k, f
1
k )),
tr2 = ((x0, ∅), σ0, (x
2
1, f
2
1 ), . . . , (x
2
k, f
2
k ), σk, . . . , (x
2
n, f
2
n), σn, (x
2
k, f
2
k )).
2. f 1i = f
1
j and f
2
i = f
2
j for any i and j in {k, k + 1, . . . , n}.
Next we provide a theorem which guarantees the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1 G is diagnosable if and only if for every cycle cl in Gd,
cl = (x1, σ1, x2, . . . , xn, σn, x1), n ≥ 1, xi = ((x
1
i , f
1), (x2i , f
2)), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
we have f 1 = f 2.
Proof: For the necessity, suppose G is diagnosable, but there exists a cycle cl in Gd, cl =
(xk, σk, xk+1, . . . , xn, σn, xk), n ≥ k, xi = ((x
1
i , f
1), (x2i , f
2)), i = k, k + 1, . . . , n, such that
f 1 6= f 2. Since Gd is accessible, there exists a path tr in Gd ending with the cycle cl, i.e.,
tr = (xd0, σ0, x1, . . . , xk, σk, . . . , xn, σn, xk). Then from Lemma 2 we know that there exist
two paths tr1 and tr2 in Go with
tr1 = ((x0, ∅), σ0, (x
1
1, f
1
1 ), . . . , (x
1
k, f
1), σk, . . . , (x
1
n, f
1), σn, (x
1
k, f
1)),
tr2 = ((x0, ∅), σ0, (x
2
1, f
2
1 ), . . . , (x
2
k, f
2), σk, . . . , (x
2
n, f
2), σn, (x
2
k, f
2)).
Further from Lemma 1, we have ∃u1v
∗
1, u2v
∗
2 ∈ L(G) such thatM(u1) =M(u2) = σ0 . . . σk−1,
M(v1) = M(v2) = σk . . . σn, and {ψ(σ) | σ ∈ ui, ψ(σ) 6= ∅} = {ψ(σ) | σ ∈ uivi, ψ(σ) 6= ∅} =
f i, i = 1, 2. Since f 1 6= f 2, we suppose Fk ∈ f
1−f 2 6= ∅. Then ∃s ∈ L(G) such that ψ(sf ) =
Fk and u1 = st for some t ∈ Σ
∗. For any integer nk, we can choose another integer ` such
that ||tv`1|| > nk. Now we have M(u2v
`
2) = M(stv
`
1) and {ψ(σ) | σ ∈ u2v2, ψ(σ) 6= ∅} = f
2,
which means that no failure event of type Fk is contained in u2v
`
2. So from the definition
of diagnosability, G is not diagnosable. A contradiction to the hypothesis. So the necessity
holds.
46
For the sufficiency, suppose for every cycle cl in Gd, cl = (x1, σ1, x2, . . . , xn, σn, x1), n ≥ 1,
xi = ((x
1
i , f
1), (x2i , f
2)), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, we have f 1 = f 2. From the second clause of Lemma 2,
we know that the hypothesis implies that ∀x = ((x1, f 1), (x2, f 2)) ∈ Xd, if f
1 6= f 2 then x is
not contained in a loop. It further implies that for any state sequence (x1, x2, · · · , xk) in Gd
with xi = (x
1
i , f
1
i ), (x
2
i , f
2
i )) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, if f
1
i 6= f
2
i for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}, then the length
of the state sequence is bounded by the number of states in Gd, i.e., k ≤ |Xd|.
Now let s be a trace in L(G) ending with a Fk-type failure event, i.e., ψ(sf ) = Fk, we
claim that ∀v = st ∈ L(G) with ||t|| > |Xd| × (|X| − 1), ∀w ∈ L(G) with M(w) = M(v),
there is a Fk-type failure event contained in w. From above, for any state x ∈ Xd that can
be reached from xd0 by executing M(s) in Gd, we have that for any state sequence starting
from x in Gd, a state y = ((y
1, f 1), (y2, f 2)) ∈ Xd with f
1 = f 2 can be reached within
|Xd| − 1 steps. This implies that ∀v = st ∈ L(G) with ||M(t)|| > |Xd| − 1, ∀w ∈ L(G)
with M(w) = M(v), there is a Fk-type failure event contained in w. Further from the
assumption that no unobservable cycle exists in G, each “observed event” in M(t) can be
preceded/followed by at most |X|−1 unobserved events. It follows that for the trace t above,
||t|| ≤ (||M(t)|| + 1) × (|X| − 1), i.e., ||M(t)|| ≥ ||t||
|X|−1
− 1. So if ||t|| > |Xd| × (|X| − 1),
then ||M(t)|| ≥ ||t||
|X|−1
− 1 > |Xd|×(|X|−1)
|X|−1
− 1 = |Xd| − 1, establishing our claim. (Note that
we have assumed implicitly that |X| > 1; otherwise if |X| = 1, then from the assumption of
no unobservable loops, no transition labeled by a failure event exists, so that the system is
trivially diagnosable.) It follows from Definition 1 that G is diagnosable. So the sufficiency
also holds.
Remark 2 From Algorithm 1, we know that the number of states in Go is at most |X|×2
|F|,
the number of transitions in Go is at most |X|
2 × 22|F| × |Σo|. Since Gd = Go||Go, the
number of states in Gd is at most |X|
2 × 22|F|, and the number of transitions in Gd is at
most |X|4 × 24|F| × |Σo|.
The complexity of performing step 1 of Algorithm 1, which construct Go, is thus O(|X|
2×
22|F|×|Σo|), whereas that of step 2 of Algorithm 1, which constructGd, is thus O(|X|
4×24|F|×
|Σo|). The complexity of performing step 3 of Algorithm 1, which detects the presence of a
certain “offending” cycle in an appropriately pruned subgraph of Gd (see the last sentence
of step 3 of Algorithm 1), is linear in the number of states and transitions of the subgraph,
i.e., it is O(|X|4 × 24|F|). Note that while detecting the presence of a “offending” cycle, the
transition labels are irrelevant.
So the complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(|X|4 × 24|F| × |Σo|) which is polynomial in the
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number of states in G and exponential in the number of failure types in G.
In [98], another necessary and sufficient condition was given for diagnosability. The
condition was expressed as a property of a certain diagnoser of the system. So in order to
check the diagnosability we needed to first construct the diagnoser, then check the property
on the diagnoser. The complexity to construct the diagnoser as well as the complexity to
check the property on the diagnoser is exponential in the number of states of the system
and doubly exponential in the number of failure types of the system. In Algorithm 1, no
diagnoser is needed for checking the diagnosability.
Remark 3 The complexity of testing diagnosability can be made polynomial in the number
of fault types as well by noting that a system is diagnosable with respect to the fault types
F = {Fi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m} if and only if it is diagnosable with respect to the each individual
fault type Fi, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m. In other words, one can apply Algorithm 1 m different times
for testing diagnosability with respect the individual failure type sets {F1}, · · · , {Fm}. Since
now each failure type set is a singleton, from Remark 2 it follows that the complexity of each
such test is O(|X|4 × 24|1| × |Σo|) = O(|X|
4 × |Σo|). So, the overall complexity of testing
diagnosability is O(|X|4 × |Σo| × |F|).
Example 1 Consider the system G = (X,Σ, δ, x0):
• X = {x0, x1, x2, x3, x4}
• Σ = {σ1, σ2, σ3, σuo, σf1, σf2, σf3}
• δ = {(x0, σ1, x1), (x1, σf1, x2), (x1, σuo, x2), (x2, σf2, x3),
(x3, σ2, x3), (x2, σf1, x4), (x4, σ3, x4)}
with the observable event set Σo = {σ1, σ2, σ3}. The system is shown in Figure 3.1. Let
x 0
σ 1
σ 2
σ 3
σ uo
σ
f1
σ
f2
σ f1
x 1 x
x 3
x 4
2
Figure 3.1: Diagram of the system G
F = {F1, F2} be the set of failure types and ψ be the failure assignment function with
ψ(σuo) = ψ(σi) = ∅, i = 1, 2, 3, ψ(σf1) = F1, ψ(σf2) = F2. From the first step in Algorithm 1,
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, φx 0 , φx 1 x 3 F 1 F 2, { , }
x 3 F 2, { }
x 4 F 1, { }
σ 1
σ 2
σ 2
σ 3
σ 3
σ 2
σ 2
Figure 3.2: Diagram of Go
we can derive Go from G, which is shown in Figure 3.2. The strict composition of Go with
itself, Gd = Go||Go, is derived from the second step in Algorithm 1, which is shown in
Figure 3.3. In Figure 3.3, there is a self loop at the state ((x3, {F2}), (x3, {F1, F2})). So from
, φx 0 , φx 0
x 3 F 2, { } x 3 F 2, { }
x 3 F 2, { } x 3 F 1 F 2, { , }
x 3 F 1 F 2, { , } x 3 F 1 F 2, { , }
x 4 F 1, { } x 4 F 1, { } x 3 F 1 F 2, { , } x 3 F 2, { }
, φx 1 , φx 1
σ 1
σ 3
σ 2
σ 2
σ 2
σ 2
σ 3 σ 2
σ 2
σ 2
σ 2
Figure 3.3: Diagram of Gd
the last step in Algorithm 1 we know the system G is not diagnosable.
Now suppose we need not distinguish the failure type F1 from the type F2. Then by letting
F2 = F1 in Figure 3.3 and deleting some redundant states, we can obtain the corresponding
Gd for the modified system. The resulting Gd is omitted here. In the modified Gd, there
does not exist any cycle as stated in step 3 of Algorithm 1. So we know the modified system
is diagnosable.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, an algorithm is provided for testing the diagnosability of discrete event
systems. Compared to the existing testing method in [98], our algorithm does not require
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the construction of a diagnoser for the system. The complexity of our algorithm is of 4th
order in the number of states of the system and linear in the number of failure types of the
system, whereas the complexity of the testing method in [98] is exponential in the number
of states of the system and doubly exponential in the number of failure types of the system.
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Chapter 4
Modeling Discrete Event Systems
with Faults using a Rules Based
Modeling Formalism
4.1 Introduction
Failure refers to a deviation from a specified behavior of the system (or a component of
the system) for a bounded or unbounded period of time. A stuck-close valve, decrease in
the efficiency of a heat exchanger, abnormal bias in the output of a sensor, and leakage in
pipelines are examples of failures. A major factor that motivates research on failure diagnosis
arises from the fact that failures are inevitable in the existing industrial environment. Given
the complex interactions between components, sub-systems, and processes, a system failure
is considered to be a normal occurrence [85], or an inherent characteristic of systems. In
large and complex systems, failure diagnosis is a critical task. This problem has received a
great deal of attention in the literature of various domains including that of discrete event
systems (DESs) [88] in [14, 39, 64, 98, 93]. A state based DES approach to failure diagnosis
was proposed in [67], and further treated in [5]. Sampath et al. have proposed a formal
language framework for studying the diagnosability properties of untimed discrete event
systems [98, 97, 95].
In this chapter, an application of the rules based modeling formalism [12] to modeling
DESs with faults is presented. We adopt an input/output view of the system, wherein the
system receives inputs and generates outputs. The input signals of the system constitute
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the independent variables, and output signals the dependent variables which are a function
of the independent variables and other dependent variables. All signals in the system are
assumed to be binary valued. Input signals change their values depending only on their own
present values; whereas output signals change their values based on their own values and the
values of other signals.
Faults in the system occur because of the malfunction of actuator or sensor signals in the
system, or because of the malfunctions in the system itself. Examples of the latter kind of
fault are those equipment failures which occur spontaneously, such as a tank beginning to
leak, the power supply of a PLC failing, and so on. These can occur without regard to the
value of any other signal in the system. Hence equipment failures are a type of input signals.
On the other hand, faults can occur in actuators which are the inputs applied to the system;
and they can occur in sensors which record the observable part of the system outputs. Such
faults usually depend on the state of other signals in the system, and hence are a type of
output signals. As an example consider the operation of actuators in a hydraulic system:
When an actuator is being turned on, it can get stuck in the off position not permitting the
flow of the fluid through it. This kind of fault is termed as a stuck closed fault. There is a
corresponding stuck open fault when the actuator, once open, cannot be mechanically shut
off. A similar type of fault can occur in the sensors: When a sensor is actuated it can get
stuck in this position, causing a stuck up position fault. A corresponding stuck down fault
can occur when the sensor, once it reaches the unactuated position, cannot change its value.
It can be seen that the occurrence of a stuck-signal fault depends on the present value of the
corresponding signal.
In order to obtain models of the system with faults, we apply the framework of [12],
which relies on establishing boolean enabling or guard conditions for each event of the DES.
An event is a transition of an input or an output signal from one binary value to another.
We start by establishing the initial conditions of the system signals. Next, for each of the
input and output events of the system, including the fault events, we obtain event occurrence
rules. For output events these are boolean constraints over values of all the signals of the
system, while for input events these are constraints only on the input signals themselves.
Weights are associated with signals which indicate the degree to which they influence the
occurrence of output events. In order to model failure prone systems, faults are incorporated
into the event occurrence rules [32, 2], and from a modeling standpoint they are treated just
the same as any other signal in the system. A binary value fault signals is introduced to
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model presence or absence of a certain fault. Addition of new fault signals requires new
rules for the added fault events, and modification of rules of existing non-faulty events, by
appropriately weakening their guard conditions.
The representation of a system with faults, in the rules based modeling formalism, is
polynomial in the size of signals and faults. The compactness of this model, together with
its intuitive nature, makes it user-friendly, less error-prone, more flexible, easily scalable, and
provides canonicity of representation for models of systems with faults.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, the preliminaries related to
modeling DESs are discussed. This is followed by an example drawn from process control
in Section 3. In Section 4, the types of fault which can occur in a system along with their
representation in the modeling formalism is discussed. This is illustrated through the earlier
process control example in Section 5. Section 6 provides conclusions and directions for future
research.
4.2 Notation and Preliminaries
The possible sequencing of input and output events of a DES can be represented by a
set of interacting automata. An overview of the automata based model of DES follows. Let
Σ denote the finite set of events. A concatenation of events forms a trace. A language is a
collection of traces. Let Σ∗ be the set of all finite traces of events of Σ including the zero
length trace ². A language is thus a subset of Σ∗.
A discrete event system is represented by a finite collection of extended automata (i.e.,
automata with enabling guard conditions on transitions) Gi indexed by i. An automaton
transitions from one state to another in response to the execution of an event provided a
certain guard condition is satisfied. Formally an extended automaton is a 5-tuple: Gi =
(Xi,Σi, Ei, x
0
i , X
m
i ); where Xi is the finite set of states, Σi is the finite set of events, Ei is
the finite set of state transitions, x0i ∈ Xi is the initial state, and X
m
i ∈ Xi is the set of final
states. Each transition e ∈ Ei is a quadruple of the form, e := (x
e, σe,Pe(ΠiXi), y
e), where
xe ∈ Xi is the state where the transition is executed, σ
e ∈ Σi is the event label of the state
transition, ye ∈ Xi is the state resulting from the execution of the transition, P
e(ΠiXi) is
the guard condition–a predicate over the states of the interacting automata–which must be
satisfied for the transition to occur. A transition is enabled at a state when the associated
guard condition evaluates to true.
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In order to obtain the overall model of the system, the synchronous composition of
automata, presented in [36], is extended to that for extended automata. Without loss
of generality, we define the synchronous composition of two extended automata, {Gi :=
(Xi,Σi, Ei, x
0
i , X
m
i )}i=1,2. The synchronous composition of G1 and G2, denoted G1‖G2, is
the automaton (X,Σ, E, x0, xm), where X := X1×X2, Σ := Σ1 ∪Σ2, x
0 := (x01, x
0
2), and the
set of transitions E = Eα ∪ Eβ ∪ Eγ, where:
Eα := {((x
e
1, x
e
2), σ
e,Pe, (ye1, y
e
2)) |
∃(xe1, σ
e,Pe1 , y
e
1) ∈ E1, (x
e
2, σ
e,Pe2 , y
e
2) ∈ E2 s.t. P
e
1 ∧ P
e
2 = P
e}
Eβ := {((x
e
1, x
e
2), σ
e,Pe, (ye1, x
e
2)) |
∃(xe1, σ
e,Pe, ye1) ∈ E1 s.t. σ
e ∈ Σ1 − Σ2}
Eγ := {((x
e
1, x
e
2), σ
e,Pe, (xe1, y
e
2)) |
∃(xe2, σ
e,Pe, ye2) ∈ E2 s.t. σ
e ∈ Σ2 − Σ1}.
Eα is the set of transitions which occur synchronously with the participation of both G1 and
G2, whereas Eβ and Eγ, respectively, are the set of transitions that occur asynchronously
with the participation of G1 and G2 only.
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Figure 4.1: Input-Output view of a discrete event system
In the rules based modeling formalism of [12] the signals present in the system are parti-
tioned into two sets: input signals and output signals. A block diagram of a discrete event
system is shown in Figure 4.1(a), which has n input and m output signals. Input signals
constitute the independent variables of the system. Their transitions occur depending solely
on their own present value, i.e. their occurrence is not influenced by any other signal in
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the system. The input signals are further divided into controllable and uncontrollable parts
depending on whether an external agent can disable them or not. Controllable input events
are the command signals sent to actuators, valves, motors of the system, in response to which
the system evolves. Uncontrollable input events are those input signals which can neither be
disabled nor enabled by any controller devised for the system. These can be operator push
buttons, switches, as well as those faults occurring in the system which are not determined
by the value of any other signal in the system. Output signals constitute the dependent
variables of the system. Their transitions occur depending on their own values and values
of other signals in the system. Output events are generated by sensors, as well as by those
faults occurring in the system which are dependent on the values of other signals of the
system.
There are t controllable inputs, s− t uncontrollable disturbance inputs, and n− s uncon-
trollable fault inputs. Output signals include q non-faulty output signals, and m − q fault
signals. All of the m output signals are considered to be uncontrollable. Only those output
signals which have corresponding sensors connected for monitoring their event transitions
can be observed. The rest are termed to be unobservable. All controllable events in the
system can be monitored, and are termed as observable events as well. In Figure 4.1(b), all
events in the system are further classified according to the properties of these events.
The rules based modeling formalism introduced in [12] is reviewed next. We model
systems involving non-discrete variables for which a discrete event system abstraction is
being sought, as is often the case in process control systems. Such systems possess signals
that take values in a continuum such as flow rates, temperatures. However, only their discrete
values are of interest for the purposes of modeling and analysis.
The rules based modeling formalism applies to systems for which the system inputs and
outputs are binary valued, and all the system states are determined by the current values of
the input and output signals of the system. A model in this formalism consists of:
1. Initial Conditions: The system starts out with certain initial values of all its signals
which is captured by the initial conditions in our modeling formalism corresponding to
the initial values of inputs and outputs of the system. This initial state is commonly
the state when parts in system are least and all the actuators are turned off.
2. Event occurrence rules: For the input events, it suffices to know just the present value
of the input signal to determine the next possible input event. This is because input
signals alternate between their off and on values regardless of the values of any other
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signals in the system. The occurrence of output events, however, is initiated by prior
occurrence of other events. Also, in most physical systems, there is a relation between
the way sensors are arranged physically and the order in which their sensed values
change. Such signal dependencies are captured through event occurrence rules. There
is one such rule per event. The consequent of each rule is an event, whereas the
antecedent is a boolean formula over the signals present in the system.
For the p’th input signal ip, its event occurrence rule takes the following form:
Ruleonp : ip ⇒ ipon;
Ruleoffp : ip ⇒ ipoff ;
These rules are termed as default since they capture the default constraint that signals
alternate between their on and off values. For a system with n input signals, there will
be 2n such default rules corresponding to each of the 2n input events in the system.
The rules for output events take on the following form for a system with m output
signals, and n input ones:
Ruleup1 : f
up
1 (i
w1
1 , ..., i
wn
n , o1, ..., oj , o
wj+1
j+1 , ..., o
wm
m )⇒ o1up,
Ruledn1 : f
dn
1 (i
w1
1 , ..., i
wn
n , o1, ..., oj , o
wj+1
j+1 , ..., o
wm
m )⇒ o1dn,
...
Ruleupm : f
up
m (i
w1
1 , ..., i
wn
n , o1, ..., oj , o
wj+1
j+1 , ..., o
wm
m )⇒ omup,
Rulednm : f
dn
m (i
w1
1 , ..., i
wn
n , o1, ..., oj , o
wj+1
j+1 , ..., o
wm
m )⇒ omdn;
where f
up/dn
1 , . . . , f
up/dn
m are the boolean formulae, consisting of those combinations
of the input signals i1, . . . , in, and output signals o1,. . . , om, which when true can
result in the enablement of an output event. Note that each input signal and certain
output signals (oj+1, .., om) are superscripted with the weight with which they influence
the associated output event. Some other output signals o1, .., oj are not weighted, or
implicitly, their weights are simply the default value 1.
The antecedent of each rule is written in the disjunctive form, where each disjunct
itself is the conjunct of three terms. The three terms within each disjunct are of the
form:
(a) f el (i
w1
1 , ..., i
wn
n , o
wj+1
j+1 , ..., o
wm
m ) := a weighted boolean formula over signals represent-
ing an enabling condition for the consequent output event.
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(b) f dl (i
w1
1 , ..., i
wn
n , o
wj+1
j+1 , ..., o
wm
m ) := a weighted boolean formula over signals represent-
ing a disabling condition for the consequent output event.
(c) f sl (i1, ..., in, o1, ..., om) := a boolean formula over unweighted input and output
signals representing an enabling condition for the consequent output event.
For Rule
up/dn
k , the antecedent of the rule then takes the following form:
N
up/dn
k∨
l=1
{[w(f el (i
w1
1 , ..., i
wn
n , o
wj+1
j+1 , ..., o
wm
m ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
enabling signals’ weight
> w(f dl (i
w1
1 , ..., i
wn
n , o
wj+1
j+1 , ..., o
wm
m ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
disabling signals’ weight
]
∧ [ f ol (i1, ..., in, o1, ..., om)︸ ︷︷ ︸
condition on unweighted signals
]}
For a system with m output signals, there are 2m event occurrence rules corresponding
to each of the 2m output events in the system.
In order to evaluate the weight of a weighted boolean formula, either a minimum or
a summation operation is used depending on whether the combination of the input
signals is an and or an or. When the composition is based upon minimum and
summation operations, the weight of a weighted boolean formula is defined inductively
as follows:
w(iw11 ∧i
w2
2 ) = min(w(i1), w(i2)) = min(w1, w2); w(i
w1
1 ∨i
w2
2 ) = w(i1)+w(i2) = w1+w2.
Thus for example,
w((iw11 ∧ i
w2
2 ) ∨ i
w3
3 ) = w(i
w1
1 ∧ i
w2
2 ) + w(i3) = min(w(i1), w(i2)) + w(i3).
Note that the choice of minimum and summation based combination of weights is ap-
plication dependent, and its semantics may be changed from application to application
without changing the syntax of the modeling formalism.
Once the rules for all the output and input events of the system have been obtained,
the algorithm of [12] may be used for translating the rules based model into an equivalent
automata model of the system. For this, the system is first represented as a composition of
a set of interacting 2-state extended automata, one automata for each of the binary valued
signals of the system. The enabling conditions present in the event occurrence rules appear
as guards for the event transitions in the 2-state extended automata models. A composition
of the interacting extended automata yields the desired automaton model, in which the
transitions with guard conditions as false are simply deleted.
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4.3 Motivating Example: A Tank System
Consider a tank filling system whose schematic is shown in Figure 5.1. It has one filling
nt2
nominal level sensor
t1
Figure 4.2: Tank system schematic
tap t1, one draining tap t2, and a nominal level sensor n. The signals in the system are t1,
t2, n, and the events that can occur in this system are t1on, t1off, t2on, t2off, nup, ndn.
Assume that the filling rate of tap t1 has the flow value of +10, while that of the draining
is +1.
The model in the rules based formalism, consisting of initial conditions and event occur-
rence rules, is given in Figure 5.2. Note that Ruleup1 simply states that for the event nup to
occur, the system should be in a state where the filling rate exceeds the draining rate, and
the level sensor is down. Ruledn1 is similar, and other rules are default ones.
1. Initial conditions: t1 = t2 = [off] ; n = [down].
2. Event occurrence rules: Since there is 1 sensor signal, n, it has 2 sensor events
associated with it, i.e. nup/ndn, and so there are 2 rules for these 2 events. In
addition there are 4 default ones for the 2 input signals t1, t2.
Ruleup1 : ([t1
+10] > [t2+1]) ∧ [n]⇒ nup;
Ruledn1 : ([t2
+1] > [t1+10]) ∧ [n]⇒ hup;
Ruleon2 : t1⇒ t1on; Rule
off
2 : t1⇒ t1off ;
Ruleon3 : t2⇒ t2on; Rule
off
3 : t2⇒ t2off.
Figure 4.3: Rules based model of the tank system without faults
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An equivalent automata model, obtained using the algorithm presented in [12], is shown
in Figure 4.4. The automaton shown in Figure 4.4(d) is obtained by taking a synchronous
t1on
t1of t1on
t2ont2on
t1on
t1on
t2on t2on
nupndn
nup
t2off
t2off
t2off
t1off
t2off
t1off
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Legend: nupn/ndn: level sensor signal values
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Figure 4.4: Automaton model of tank system without faults
composition of the extended 2-state automata models of the taps, t1 and t2, (Figure 4.4(a)
and (b) respectively), and that of the water level sensor, n, (Figure 4.4(c)). Note that
the antecedent of the rules appear as guards in the 2-state extended automata models. For
example, Gup1 is the weighted boolean formula ([t1
+10] > [t2+1])∧ [n], which is the antecedent
of Ruleup1 of Figure 5.2. Transitions of the composed automata, in which the guards evaluate
to false, have been omitted.
4.4 Modeling failures in the rules based formalism
In order to obtain event occurrence rules for a system with faults, we examine the
possible kinds of faults, and also the manner in which they are represented in the rules based
modeling formalism.
4.4.1 Signal and system faults
The kinds of faults which can occur in the type of discrete event systems we consider
include, the stuck-signal faults, and the system or equipment faults.
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1. Stuck-signal faults: These faults occur when any of the actuators or sensors in the
system, owing to mechanical, electrical, or electromagnetic interference problems, gets
stuck in a particular position with its logic status becoming either true or false
permanently, until a recovery occurs through a repair or a replacement. When an
actuator gets stuck in the on/off position such fault signals are denoted by so(stuck
open)/sc(stuck closed) respectively; where the associated fault events are denoted by
soF/scF and the recovery events by soR/scR, respectively. In the tank system the
filling tap t1 may be prone to an stuck open fault signal denoted by t1so, with the
fault event denoted as t1soF and the recovery event denoted as t1soR. When the fault
event t1soF occurs, filling will continue to occur even after the command to switch off
the tap has been given, unless the fault recovery event occurs.
When a sensor gets stuck in the up/dn(down) position such fault signals are denoted
by sup(stuck up)/sdn(stuck dn) respectively; whereas the associated fault events are
denoted by supF/sdnF, and the recovery events by supR/sdnR, respectively. The tank
system in Figure 5.1 has a level sensor n which may be prone to a stuck up fault
signal, denoted by nsup. This signal has two events: the fault event nsupF, and the
corresponding recovery event nsupR.
It should be noted that stuck-signal faults are a type of output signals since they are
dependent on values of signals prone to stuck-signal faults. Referring to Figure 4.1(a),
it can be seen that of the m output signals, m− q are fault signals.
2. System/equipment faults: Apart from faults of the signals there are faults of sys-
tems and its components. Certain fault signals such as equipment failures, power
disruptions, system software crashes, etc., affect the entire system. These can occur
spontaneously in the system depending only on their own values, not those of any
other signal in the system. They are thus independent variables and form part of the
inputs to the system. In the tank system of Figure 5.1, a leakage fault signal, which
causes the fluid levels to drop in the tank, is an example of a system/equipment fault.
The events of the leakage fault are leakageF and leakageR, denoting leakage fault and
recovery from leakage events.
It should be noted that system faults are a type of input signals since they are inde-
pendent of values of other signals. Referring to Figure 4.1(a), it can be seen that of
the n input signals, n− s are fault signals.
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4.4.2 Permanent and intermittent faults
Another categorization of faults arises from the manner in which faults are reset after they
occur.
1. Permanent faults: If the recovery event occurs only due to a repair/replacement of
the fault, then the fault is regarded as a permanent fault.
2. Intermittent faults: If the recovery event can occur either spontaneously or through
repair/replacement, then the fault is regarded as an intermittent fault. Example is a
loose wire that makes and breaks contact spontaneously.
It is important to distinguish between these two types of faults, since the intermittent fault
spontaneous recovery events, which tend to be uncontrollable and unobservable, may the
system to oscillate between non-faulty and fault states. Permanent faults, on the other
hand, are associated with recovery events (repair/replacement) which are controllable and
observable, and the system cannot spontaneously move from a fault state to a non-fault one.
4.4.3 Rules for fault events
1. Stuck-signal faults: Stuck-signal faults occur in both actuators and sensors when
the value of the signal gets stuck at a certain logic level. The rules for both these kinds
of signals are discussed next:
• Stuck actuator signal faults: If the r’th actuator, Ar, is prone to both the stuck
open fault which occurs only after the actuator is already in the on condition, and
the stuck closed fault which occurs only when the actuator is already in the off
condition, then the rule for the occurrence of these stuck actuator signal faults is
written as:
RuleonArso : Ar ∧ Arso⇒ ArsoIF ; Rule
off
Arso : ArsoIF ⇒ ArsoR;
RuleonArsc : Ar ∧ Arsc⇒ ArscIF ; Rule
off
Arsc : ArscIF ⇒ ArscR.
Here recovery from the fault is considered to spontaneously occur without regards
to the value of any other signals in the system. In case the recovery is initiated
by other signals in the system they will appear in the antecedent of the rule.
As an example consider the tank system of Figure 5.1 with a faulty inlet tap t1,
prone to a stuck open fault. Assuming that no recovery is possible from the stuck
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open fault event, the rules for the fault events t1soF and t1soR are:
Ruleont1so : t1 ∧ t1so⇒ t1soF ; Rule
off
t1so : false⇒ t1soR.
• Stuck sensor signal faults: If the r’th sensor in a system, Sr, is prone to both the
stuck up fault which occurs only after it has been actuated, and the stuck down
fault which occurs only when the sensor is not actuated, then the rule for the
occurrence of these stuck sensor signal faults is written as:
RuleupSrsup : Sr ∧ Srsup⇒ SrsupF ; Rule
dn
Srsup : Srsup⇒ SrsupR;
RuleupSrsdn : Sr ∧ Srsdn⇒ SrsdnF ; Rule
dn
Srsdn : Srsdn⇒ SrsdnR.
Stuck-signal failures of signals may have a non-unity weight assigned to them.
2. System or equipment faults: The rules for the t’th equipment fault, Et, is expressed
in the rules based modeling formalism as:
RuleonEt : Et ⇒ EtF ; Rule
off
Et : Et ⇒ EtR.
Here the recovery from the fault is considered to be occur independently of the values
of any other signals in the system. In case the recovery is initiated by other signals in
the system, they will appear in the antecedent of the rule.
In the process control system of Figure 5.1, a leakage fault, which causes the fluid level
to drop, is an example of a system fault. Now in addition to the existing rules shown in
Figure 4.7, an additional pair of rules Rule
on/off
6 , is defined to account for this newly
added fault signal:
Ruleon6 : leakage⇒ leakageF ; Rule
off
6 : leakage⇒ leakageR.
3. Intermittent faults: If the r’th signal/equipment, Ar, is prone to an intermittent
fault, recovery from such a fault can occur either spontaneouly (ArIR) or by re-
pair/replacement of the faulty device (ArR).
RuleonArso : Ar ∧ Arso⇒ ArsoIF ;
RuleoffArso : (Arso) ∧ (ArR ∨ ArIR)⇒ ArsoR;
RuleonArsc : Ar ∧ Arsc⇒ ArscIF ;
RuleoffArsc : (Arsc) ∧ (ArR ∨ ArIR)⇒ ArscR.
As an example consider the tank system of Figure 5.1 with a faulty inlet tap t1, prone
to a stuck open fault. The rules for the fault events t1soF and t1soR are:
Ruleont1so : t1 ∧ t1so⇒ t1soIF ; Rule
off
t1so : (t1so) ∧ (t1R ∨ t1IR)⇒ t1soR.
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4.4.4 Extension of non-fault event rules to include fault conditions
In the presence of faults the guard conditions of the non-fault event rules are weakened
by introducing additional disjunctive conditions under which the non-fault event can also
occur. The antecedent of each rule now contains the disjunct of a group of terms which
represent how the consequent event can occur under both non-faulty and faulty conditions.
Example of extension of rules under stuck-signal faults: Consider the tank system of
Figure 5.1 with a faulty inlet tap t1 having a filling rate of +10, prone to a stuck open fault,
whose occurrence does not alter the non-faulty filling rate through the tap. The rule for
the output level sensor event nup in the presence of the stuck open fault t1so is given in
Figure 4.7 as:
Ruleup1 : ([t1so
+10 > t2+1] ∧ [n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
fault conditions
∨
([t1+10 > t2+1] ∧ [n ∧ t1so])︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-fault conditions
⇒ nup.
The antecedent of this rule is now a disjunct of two terms, the first one corresponds to
the level sensor going up under the t1so fault; whereas the second one corresponds to the
level sensor going up under the non-faulty condition, and is essentially the same as the
corresponding antecedent for the system model without faults.
Note that if the actuator t1 in the tank system of Figure 5.1 is subjected to a stuck open
fault, the rate of filling may change from the normal value to some other value under faulty
conditions. So, for example, if the filling rate changes from +10 to +7 in the presence of the
t1so fault, then the output event occurrence rule becomes:
Ruleup1 : ([t1so
+7 > t2+1] ∧ [n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
fault conditions
∨
([t1+10 > t2+1] ∧ [n ∧ t1so])︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-fault conditions
⇒ nup.
Example of extension of rules under system/equipment faults: Owing to the modeling of
the leakage fault signal, the rule for the filling event (nup) and for the draining event (ndn)
are altered as well. For example, the new extended rule Ruleup1 , having a t1soF with a filling
rate of +10, and a draining tap t2 with a draining rate of +1, and the tank susceptible to a
leakage fault having a draining rate of +3, is given by:
Ruleup1 : ([t1so
+10 > (t2+1 ∨ leakage+3)] ∧ [n])︸ ︷︷ ︸
fault conditions
∨
(([t1+10 > [t2+1 ∨ leakage+3])] ∧ [n ∧ t1so])︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-fault conditions
⇒ nup.
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4.4.5 Fault signal automata models
In order to account for the faults in a system, additional 2-state extended automata
[nsup] Guard
2Guard2dn up[t1so]
[leakage]
(b)
Equipment failure − leaking tank
(c)
Legend: 
leakageFleakageR
(a)
Legend: Legend: 
t1soR t1soF nsupFnsupR
Of input signal − actuator ‘t1’ stuck open Of output signal − sensor ‘n’ stuck open
[nsup]
[t1so]GuardGuard
5 5
off on
[leakage]GuardGuarddn up
6 6
Stuck signal faults 
System/Equipment faults
t1soF: t1 stuck open fault event
t1soR: t1 stuck open recovery event
leakageR: tank leakage recovery event
nsupF: n stuck up fault 
nsupR: n stuck up recovery event
leakageF: tank leakage fault event
Figure 4.5: Automata models for signal and system faults
models are drawn with their states representing the faulty and non-faulty conditions. These
extended automata are composed with the rest of the extended automata to obtain a single
automaton model of a DES that is subjected to failures. The two fault scenarios considered in
the rules based modeling formalism are stuck-signal value faults and the system/equipment
faults.
For the tank system of Figure 5.1, the corresponding automata models for the example
faults which can occur in the system are shown in Figure 4.5. The 2-state extended automata,
which model the stuck open fault which may occur in the actuator t1, and the stuck close
fault which may occur in the level sensor n, are shown in Figure 4.5(a), (b) respectively, along
with their corresponding recovery events. In Figure 4.5(c), a 2-state automata model is given
for a type of system fault, the leakage fault, having as its states no-leakage ([leakage]) and
leakage ([leakage]), with transitions between these states on events leakage-fault (leakageF )
and leakage-recovery (leakageR), respectively. The antecedent of the event occurrence rules
associated with the events appear as guard conditions in the 2-state extended automata
model. Refer to Figure 4.7 for the guards for the fault events t1soF, t1soR, nsupF , and
nsupR, and to Section 4.4 above for the guards for the fault events leakageF , and leakageR.
Only when the guard condition evaluates to true, is the corresponding event transition in
the automaton permitted to occur.
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4.5 Application: modeling tank systems with faults
In order to illustrate the modeling of systems with faults in the rules based formalism, we
introduce certain fault conditions in the tank system of Figure 5.1, and obtain an automaton
and an rules based model for it. Assume that the filling actuator t1 can get stuck in the
open position, represented by an output fault signal, t1so, and the level sensor can get stuck
in the true state, represented by an output fault signal, nsup. The complete set of events
that can occur in this system are t1on, t1off, t2on, t2off, nup, ndn, t1soF, t1soR, nsupF,
nsupR. Here t1soR is the t1 stuck open recovery event and nsupR is the n stuck up recovery
event. Assume that the filling rate of tap t1 has the flow value of +10, even in the presence
of the t1so fault, while the draining rate of the tap t2 is +1.
We present an automaton model of the system and next present the rules based model
which contains as much information as the more complex automaton model, but is compact
and simpler to obtain and debug. The automaton model of the system is shown in Figure 4.6,
1
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Figure 4.6: Automaton model of the tank system with faults
and has a total of 24 states, of which the states marked 1 . . . 8 represent the non-faulty states
of the system. State 1 is the initial state in which the level sensor is low, and both the filling
and draining taps are turned off. When the filling tap t1 is turned on, t1on, then there is a
transition to State 2, where the level of fluid in the tank rises, until either the nup event of
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the sensor occurs taking the system to State 6, or the event t1off occurs causing the system
to return to the initial state. Transitions to other states are drawn out in a similar fashion.
In all the states where the tap t1 is turned on, it can get stuck in this position, a t1so fault
signal, and is indicated by a transition on the event t1soF. Once that event occurs commands
of t1on/t1off have no effect on the system state, and the tap t1 continues to permit fluid flow
through it regardless of the control commands applied to it. A corresponding recovery event
t1soR is defined which returns the system to the non-faulty state of the tap t1. Also, in all
the states where the level sensor n is true, i.e, nup, the sensor can get stuck in this position,
indicated by the occurrence of a fault signal nsup event nsupF, after which the sensor event
ndn cannot occur even if the fluid level in the tank becomes low, until the recovery event
nsupR occurs. We assume for this example that recovery events are infeasible (by disallowing
any repair or replacement). So although recovery events t1soR and nsupR are defined, no
transitions are feasible on such events in this example.
The model of the tank system with faults in the rules based modeling formalism is shown
in Figure 4.7.
1. Initial conditions: t1 = t2 = t1so = nsup = [off];n = [down].
2. Event occurrence rules:
Ruleup1 : ([t1so
+10 > t2+1] ∧ [n])
∨
([t1+10 > t2+1] ∧ [n ∧ t1so])⇒ nup
Ruledn1 : ([t2
+1 > t1so+10] ∧ [n]) ∨ ([t2+1 > t1+10] ∧ [n ∧ t1so])⇒ ndn;
Ruleon2 : t1⇒ t1on; Rule
off
2 : t1⇒ t1off ;
Ruleon3 : t2⇒ t2on; Rule
off
3 : t2⇒ t2off ;
Ruleup4 : n ∧ nsup⇒ nsupF ; Rule
dn
4 : false⇒ nsupR;
Ruleon5 : t1 ∧ t1so⇒ t1soF ; Rule
off
5 : false⇒ t1soR.
Figure 4.7: Rules based model of the tank system with faults
Note that the initial condition now includes conditions on both non-fault and fault signals.
The rules are self-explanatory, and this rules based model contains the same amount of
information as the more complex automaton model shown in Figure 4.6. As might be
evident, attempting to obtain an automaton model for the tank system in the presence of
actuator and sensor faults is not an easy task. In contrast, modeling the tank system prone
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to failures by applying the procedure outlined in Section 4.4, yields a compact rules based
model as is evidenced from Figure 4.7. If needed, this model can be automatically translated
into an equivalent automaton model, resulting in the automaton of Figure 4.6.
4.6 Incorporating delay faults in the modeling formal-
ism
In any real world system the timing of events occurring within it is of considerable
significance, and in many cases if an event occurs either too soon or too late the system
might not function properly. For example, in an assembly line if the interval between the
arrival of parts at a buffer feeding a workstation is too short, then the buffer may get filled
faster than the workstation can process parts, thereby forcing the operations of upstream
machines to slow down or even stop completely. Also, if the inter-arrival times at the buffer
are too large, then the workstation it feeds will get starved for parts, with machines further
downstream possibly being affected as well. A similar scenario can occur in process control
systems. For example, in the tank system shown in Figure 5.1, if the level of fluid in the
tank is initially low, and the filling tap t1 is turned on, with or without the draining tap t2
being on as well, then in either case time bounds can be associated within which the level
sensor signal should make a up-going transition. Hence, it is usually not sufficient to just
specify that the logical properties of the system are not violated. We can also model the
timing properties of signals which are of interest and report the occurrence of delay faults
when the time-bounds associated with any event are violated.
4.6.1 Rules for timely occurrence/delay faults
The rules based modeling formalism can be extended to model real-time systems by
including guard conditions that involve clock variables which monitor the time-bounds within
which events should occur. For this, we may include certain “timed guards” along with the
“untimed guards” in any rule.
Consider for example the “untimed rule” for an event σ with the untimed guard condition
Gσ:
Gσ ⇒ σ.
Here Gσ is a predicate defined over the values of the signals of the system. In order to model
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real-time behavior of the system, the untimed guard is augmented by certain timed guards
defined over a certain set of clock variables C. Each clock in the set C is initialized to zero,
and evolves at rate 1 as time elapses. These clocks keep track of the time since they were last
reset due to the occurrence of a resetting event. The augmented rule specifies the condition
under which the event σ should occur and is given by:
∃i ∈ I : Giσ ∧ T
i
σ ⇒ σ,C
i
σ.
So, the event σ occurs when a guard Giσ∧T
i
σ for some i in an index set I is satisfied. Here the
untimed guard Gσ has been partitioned into I sub-guards {G
i
σ, i ∈ I}, i.e.,
∨
i∈I G
i
σ = Gσ,
and for each i ∈ I, T iσ is a timed guard defined over the set of clock variables. C
i
σ ⊆ C is the
set of clocks that are reset when the event σ occurs due to the satisfaction of the condition
Giσ ∧ T
i
σ. If C
i
σ is not specified explicitly it implies that none of the clocks associated with
the event σ are reset to their initial values.
Since the rule ∃i ∈ I : Giσ ∧ T
i
σ ⇒ σ,C
i
σ, specifies the condition for timely occurrence
of the event σ, a delay fault is said to have occurred if σ occurs at an instance when the
condition ∃i ∈ I : Giσ ∧ T
i
σ is violated, or equivalently when the condition ∃i ∈ I : G
i
σ ∧ T
i
σ
holds. Thus implicit in the rule of timely occurrence of the event σ, is another rule that
captures a delay fault occurrence of σ, and is given by:
∃i ∈ I : Giσ ∧ T
i
σ ⇒ σ,C
i
σ.
The timed guard T iσ associated with the event σ is a predicate over the values of clocks,
which is defined as follows. A timed guard ϕ is defined by the grammar
ϕ := x ≤ c | c ≤ x | x < c | c < x | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ,
where x is a clock in C and c is a rational constant. The set of all timed guards over the set
of clocks C is denoted by Φ(C).
In the system, the input signals can be forced to occur at any time, meaning their
timed guards are true. Also in the case of output signals, the stuck-signal and the sys-
tem/equipment fault can occur at any time, and their timed guards are true as well. It
is only the non-fault output signals such as the sensor signals that have non-trivial timeds
guard associated with their events.
As an example consider the tank system of Figure 5.1 in which the combination of the
inlet tap t1 and the outlet tap t2, fill the tank within 4 time units. this can be captured in
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a rule for nup as follows:
Ruleupn : [(t1
10 > t21) ∧ n]
∧
[((t1 ∧ t2) ∧ [0 ≤ ct1.t2 ≤ 4]) ∨ (t1 ∧ t2)]⇒ nup.
Here ct1.t2 is the clock that monitors the time elapsed since both t1 and t2 were switched on,
and it is achieved by resetting ct1.t2 in the rules for t1on and t2on as follows:
Ruleon2 : t1⇒ t1on, {ct1.t2}; Rule
off
2 : t1⇒ t1off ;
Ruleon3 : t2⇒ t2on, {ct1.t2}; Rule
off
3 : t2⇒ t2off.
We next model a more detailed example with delay faults occurring at multiple locations
during a tank filling-draining process. Consider the tank system shown in Figure 5.1, with
the nup event subject to a delay fault when both the filling and draining taps are turned on.
For the purpose of illustrating the rules based framework under delay fault conditions only,
we assume that no stuck-signal or equipment faults occur in the system.
In the tank system the filling rate of tap t1 is larger than the draining rate of tap t2.
Hence, if initially the level of fluid in the tank is low, the level sensor nup event can occur
either when only the filling tap t1 is turned on, or when both the filling and draining taps
t2 are on. Assume that the time it takes to fill the tank when both the filling and draining
taps are on is a maximum of 4 time-units, and 3.6 time-units when only the filling tap is on.
On the other hand, it can be the case that the level sensor n is close to the switching level
for nup at an instant when t1 is turned one, in which case the event nup occurs immediately.
These scenarios set the bounds within with the event nup can occur. We associate a clock,
ct1.t2 for monitoring the time bound when both the taps are on, and ct1.t2 when tap t1 is on
and tap t2 is off. The timing guard for ct1.t2 is given by: {0 ≤ ct1.t2 ≤ 4}, and for ct1.t2 by
{0 ≤ ct1.t2 ≤ 3.6}. If the draining time is not of interest for delay fault monitoring, then no
clock needs to be associated with the draining event. Alternately, a clock monitoring the
ndn event can be associated with the time-bound (0,+∞).
The model of the tank system in the rules based modeling formalism is shown in Fig-
ure 4.8, where Ruleup1 captures the timely occurrence of event nup.
Note that the clock ct1.t2 is reset whenever there is a t1on or t2on event. The resets for
ct1.t2 are obtained in a similar way, i.e., whenever there is a t1on or a t2off event.
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1. Initial conditions: t1 = t2 = t1so = nsup = [off];n = [down]; ct1.t2 = 0.
2. Event occurrence rules:
Ruleup1 : [(t1
+10 > t2+1) ∧ n]
∧
[(t2 ∧ (0 ≤ ct1.t2 ≤ 4)) ∨ (t2 ∧ (0 ≤ ct1.t2 ≤ 3.6))]⇒ nup;
Ruledn1 : [t2
+1 > t1+10] ∧ [n]⇒ ndn;
Ruleon2 : t1⇒ t1on, {ct1.t2, ct1.t2};
Ruleoff2 : t1⇒ t1off ;
Ruleon3 : t2⇒ t2on, {ct1.t2};
Ruleoff3 : t2⇒ t2off, {ct1.t2}.
Figure 4.8: Rules based model of the tank system with delay faults
4.6.2 Timed automaton model for timely occurrence/delay faults
The rules based model with timing guards can be represented using extended 2-state
timed automata. An extended timed automaton is a 6-tuple:
Gi = (Xi,Σi, Ei, x
0
i , X
m
i , C),
where Xi is the finite set of states, Σi is the finite set of events, Ei is the finite set of state
transitions, x0i ∈ Xi is the initial state, X
m
i ⊆ Xi is the set of final states, C is a finite set of
clocks. Each transition e ∈ Ei is a 5-tuple of the form, e := (x
e, σe,Pe(ΠiXi) ∧ ϕ
e, Ce, ye),
where xe ∈ Xi is the state where the transition is executed, σ
e ∈ Σi is the event label
of the state transition, ye ∈ Xi is the state resulting from the execution of the transition,
Pe(ΠiXi) is the untimed guard condition and ϕ
e ∈ Φ(C) is the timed guard condition—they
must together be satisfied for the transition to occur, and Ce ⊆ C is the set of clocks that
get reset to zero when the transition occurs. A transition is enabled at a state when the
associated guard condition evaluates to true.
By associating timing with the guards of an event representing the timely occurrence of
the event, the delay fault information is included implicitly. Whenever the system is at a
state from where an event is possible, by examining the timed portion of the guard and the
occurrence time of event, the presence or absence of a delay fault can be identified.
The algorithm for automatically deriving an equivalent automaton model out of the
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model in the proposed formalism is given next:
1. Obtain an untimed automaton, using the untimed portion of the rules as in [12].
2. For each transition on event σ, add the timing guard T iσ at the states where G
i
σ holds,
and also incorporate the associated set of clocks C iσ that need to be reset.
For the tank example under consideration, the automata models of the level sensor n,
containing the untimed guards are shown in Figure 4.9(a), and those for the events t1on/off,
and t2on/off are shown in Figure 4.9(b), (c). These extended automata are then composed
G ndn nupG
G t1off G t1on
P2
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t1ont1off
[t1: on]
(b)
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t2on/t2off: tap2 turned on/off
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Figure 4.9: Timed automaton model for timely occurrence/delay faults
using synchronous composition, and the transitions whose untimed guards evaluate to true
are retained in the final automaton. For the tank system this is shown in Figure 4.9(d).
Now, the appropriate timed guards are added on appropriate transitions. The timed guard
(0 ≤ ct1.t2 ≤ 4) appears in Figure 4.9(d) on the nup event transition at the state where
t1 and t2 are on; while the timed guard (0 ≤ ct1.t2 ≤ 3.6) on the nup event transition at
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the state where t1 is on and t2 is off. The clocks ct1.t2 and ct1.t2 are reset when events t1on
or t2on, and t1on or t2off occur respectively. This is the overall timed automaton of the
system.
4.7 Conclusions
The rules based modeling formalism of [12] has been applied in order to obtain models
of discrete event systems prone to failures. Stuck-signal faults, system/equipment faults
and delay faults have been modeled in the rules based modeling formalism. This formalism
presents a scalable as well as flexible alternative to the modeling discrete event systems
prone to faults. Such models may be automatically converted to their equivalent automata
models, for further analysis such as verification, diagnosis, and control. The technique has
been demonstrated to work for a class of systems with discrete event system abstractions,
comprising of boolean valued input/output signals. The formalism can be easily extended
to include non-binary valued signals (more values means more states and transitions in the
extended automata representation, and so more rules per signal). The rules based formalism
being polynomial in the size of signals, provides a solution for the problem of state space
explosion associated with automata models. The compact rules based model greatly aids
rapid reconstruction and error-checking of the model, specially when elements are added,
removed, or configured differently within the system.
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Chapter 5
Diagnosis of Discrete Event Systems
in Rules Based Model using
First-order Linear Temporal Logic
5.1 Introduction
Detection and isolation of failures in large, complex systems is a crucial and challenging
task. A failure is a deviation of a system from its normal or required behavior, such as
occurrence of a failure event, or visiting a failed state, or more generally, violating a design
specification. A stuck-close valve, decrease in the efficiency of a heat exchanger, abnormal
bias in the output of a sensor, and leakage in pipelines are examples of events that can lead
to failures. Failure diagnosis is the process of detecting and identifying such deviations in
a system using the information available through sensors. The problem of failure diagnosis
has received considerable attention in the literature of reliability engineering, control, and
computer science; and a wide variety of schemes have been proposed. Recently, it has also
been studied in the framework of discrete event systems (DESs) [5, 6, 7, 13, 79, 38, 22, 77,
46, 59, 64, 65, 98, 99, 96, 23, 112, 117, 118, 93, 71, 31].
A notion of failure diagnosis of qualitative behaviors of discrete event systems was first
proposed in [98]. The idea is that if the DES executes a faulty event, then it must be
diagnosed within a bounded number of state-transitions/events. A method for constructing
a diagnoser was developed, and a necessary and sufficient condition of diagnosability was
obtained in terms of certain properties of the constructed diagnoser. The above work was
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further extended to timed systems in [13] and to decentralized diagnosis in [23]. In [46], an
algorithm of polynomial complexity for testing diagnosability without having to construct a
diagnoser was obtained. This later work enabled a quick test for diagnosability; by applying
this test a diagnoser is constructed only for those systems that are diagnosable. Note that
the off-line construction of a diagnoser is of exponential complexity [98].
In [64, 65], the authors proposed a state-based approach for diagnosis; they studied the
problems of off-line and on-line diagnosis where the basic idea was to “test and observe”.
Extensions of the above work can be found in [5] where the authors studied testability of
DESs. In [6, 7], the problem of failure detection in communication networks was studied,
where both the normal and faulty behaviors of the system were modeled by formal languages.
In [79], the authors also studied the problem of fault detection in communication networks
where faults are specified as change and addition of arcs in the finite state machine model
of the normal system, and a diagnosis method was provided. In [93], a state-based approach
for failure diagnosis of timed systems was proposed. In [38, 22, 77], the authors developed
a template based monitoring scheme using timing and sequencing relationships of events for
fault monitoring in manufacturing systems. In [112], the application of DESs techniques to
digital circuits was studied, and an algorithm for the delay fault testability modeling and
analysis was presented.
In most above works, the non-faulty behavior of the system, also called the specification,
is either specified by an automaton (containing no failure states) or by a language (event-
traces containing no failure events). Since in practical setting, a specification is generally
given in a natural language, we need to first transform a natural language specification
into a formal language specification before we apply the above failure diagnosis results.
Given a simple natural language specification, the process of finding a corresponding formal
language specification can be tedious, unintuitive, and error-prone, making it unaccessible
to non-specialists. So there exists a gap between the informal natural language specification
and the corresponding formal language specification. Temporal logic based specification was
proposed in [26] as an attempt to bridge such a gap. Temporal logic has been used in the
analysis and control of DESs [48, 103, 102, 115, 80, 4, 52, 75, 76, 68, 105, 63, 69]; and it has
also been used as a formalism for diagnosing DESs in [84, 47, 20].
In this chapter, we study the failure diagnosis problem for systems modeled in a rules
based model [12], extended to include faults [43]. State variables and rules for modify-
ing their values are used to compactly model a DES. The representation of a system with
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faults, in the rules based modeling formalism, is polynomial in the size of signals and faults.
The compactness of this model, together with its intuitive nature, makes it user-friendly,
less error-prone, more flexible, easily scalable, and provides canonicity of representation for
models of systems with faults. The motivation of the work presented here is to develop
techniques for failure diagnosis that are able to exploit the compactness of the model. In
this regard, we develop techniques based on 1st-order temporal logic model-checking and
predicates and predicate transformers.
The rules based modeling formalism is based on an input/output view of the system. The
input signals of the system are the independent variables, and output signals the dependent
variables which are a function of the independent variables and of other dependent variables.
For simplicity, all signals in the system are assumed to be binary valued (extension to non-
binary valued signals has been considered in rule-based formalism [12]), and it is also assumed
that the state of the system can be specified by the current values of the signals (extension to
the case when the state depends on also the past values of the signals has also been considered
in [12]). In order to model failure prone systems, a binary valued fault signal is introduced to
model presence or absence of each fault. From a modeling standpoint, the fault signals are
treated just the same as any other signal in the system. Addition of fault signals to capture
the faulty behavior requires new rules for the added fault events, and modification of rules
of existing non-faulty events, by appropriately weakening their enabling guard conditions.
In the rule-based model, initial conditions are used to specify the initial values of the
system signals. An event is a transition of an input or an output signal from one binary
value to another. For each of the input and output events of the system (which includes the
fault events), we obtain event occurrence rules. The antecedent of such a rule is a predicate
over the signal values that serves as an enabling condition.
In this chapter we use 1st order model checking for testing diagnosability of DESs, and
predicates and predicate transformers for building an online diagnoser. We illustrate through
various examples how the diagnosability of DESs modeled using a rules based formalism
[12] prone to faults can be checked, and how an online diagnoser for the system can be
constructed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the definitions of predicates
and predicate transformers, rules based model, diagnosability, and 1st order LTL temporal
logic are introduced. In Section 3, diagnosability as a 1st order LTL temporal logic model-
checking is studied, and illustrated via an example. An algorithm for on-line diagnoser is
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provided in Section 4 and illustrated using an example. Conclusions is provided in Section
5.
5.2 Notation and Preliminaries
5.2.1 Predicates, their Transformers, and Rule-based Model
A discrete event system, denoted G, is a 4-tuple G := (X,Σ,;, X0), where X denotes
the state set, Σ is the finite event set, ; ⊆ X × Σ ×X is the set of state transitions, and
X0 ⊆ X is the set of initial states. We use state variables to represent the states and a finite
set of conditional assignment statements, called rules, to represent the state transitions.
The notation ~v is used to denote the vector of state variables of G. If ~v is n-dimensional,
then ~v = [v1, . . . , vi, . . . , vn], where vi is the ith state variable. The state space X of G equals
the Cartesian product of domains of all state variables, i.e., X :=
∏n
i=1D(vi), where D(vi) is
the domain of vi. By definition D(vi) is a countable set and can be identified with the set of
natural numbers N .
We use predicates for describing various subsets of the state space. Let P(~v) denote the
collection of predicates defined using the state variable vector ~v, i.e., if P (~v) ∈ P(~v), then it
is a boolean valued map P (~v) : X → {0, 1}. Consider for example a two dimensional state
space X = Z2. Then the predicate P (~v) = [v1 ≥ v2] refers to all the states in which the
value of variable v1 is at least as large as the value of variable v2. The symbols true and
false are used for denoting predicates that hold on all and none of the states respectively.
With every predicate P (~v) ∈ P(~v), we associate a set XP ⊆ X on which P (~v) takes the
value one. Thus the collection of predicates P(~v) has a one-to-one correspondence with the
power set 2X , and the names predicates and state-sets can be used interchangeably. We say
that the predicate P (~v) holds on Xˆ ⊆ X if Xˆ ⊆ XP .
State transitions map a state to another state. Such mappings are extended to set of
states or predicates in a natural way, and are known as predicate transformers. We use F
to denote the collection of all predicate transformers, i.e., if f ∈ F , then f : P(~v) → P(~v).
The conjunctive closure of f , denoted f∗, and disjunctive closure of f denoted f
∗ is defined
to be
∧
i≥0 f
i and
∨
i≥0 f
i respectively, where f 0 is the identity predicate transformer and
f i+1 := f(f i). Given f : X → X, the substitution predicate transformer“~v ; f(~v)” maps a
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predicate P (~v) to P (f(~v)). Consider for example the f given by
(v1, v2) ; (v1 + v2, v1 − v2).
Then the corresponding substitution predicate transformer maps the predicate [v1 < v2] to
[v1 + v2 < v1 − v2] = [v2 < 0].
Next we review the rule-based model [12] (which is a specific assignment program model
[56]) for representing a DES G described above. The initial state set of G is specified as
an initial predicate, denoted I(~v), which implies X0 = XI . The state transitions “;” of G
is specified using a finite set of rules, also called conditional assignment statements, of the
form:
σ : [Cσ(~v)]⇒ [~v ; fσ(~v)],
where σ ∈ Σ is an event, Cσ(~v) is a predicate, called the enabling condition or the guard,
and fσ : X → X is a map defined on the state space. If no guard is present, then true is
treated as the guard. A conditional assignment statement of the above type is enabled if
the condition Cσ(~v) holds. An enabled assignment statement may execute. Upon execution,
new values are assigned to the state variables according to the map fσ and a state transition
on the event σ occurs. For simplicity, we assume that if multiple assignment statements are
simultaneously enabled, only one of them is nondeterministically executed. This assumption
may be relaxed to allow concurrency of execution.
The following example illustrates the representation of a DES using the rules based
modeling formalism.
Example 2 Consider a tank filling system whose schematic is shown in Figure 5.1. It has
nt2
nominal level sensor
t1
Figure 5.1: Tank system schematic
one filling tap t1, one draining tap t2, and a nominal level sensor n. The signals in the
system are t1, t2, n, and the events that can occur in this system are t1on, t1off, t2on, t2off,
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nup, ndn. Assume that the filling rate of tap t1 has the flow value of +10, while that of the
draining is +1.
The model in the rules based formalism, consisting of initial conditions and event occur-
rence rules, is given in Figure 5.2. Note that the rule for nup simply states that for the event
nup to occur, the system should be in a state where the filling rate exceeds the draining rate,
and the level sensor is down. The rule for ndn is similar, and other rules are default ones.
1. Initial conditions: t1, t2, n = [off, off, down].
2. Event occurrence rules:
nup : [(t1+10 > t2+1) ∧ n]⇒ [n ; n]
ndn : [(t2+1 > t1+10) ∧ n]⇒ [n ; n]
t1on : [t1]⇒ [t1 ; t1]; t1off : [t1]⇒ [t1 ; t1]
t2on : [t2]⇒ [t2 ; [t2]; t2off : [t2]⇒ [t2 ; t2]
Figure 5.2: Rules based model of the tank system
The substitution predicate transformer can be used to define the forward one-step reach-
able, fr, and backward one-step reachable, br, predicate transformers for G. fr determines
the “postcondition” after the occurrence of a state transition for a given “precondition”,
whereas br determines the “precondition” prior to the occurrence of a state transition for a
given postcondition.
For the assignment statement σ : [Cσ(~v)]⇒ [~v ; fσ(~v)] and a condition P (~v), these are
formally defined as follows:
fr(P (~v), σ) := Cσ(f
−1
σ (~v)) ∧ P (f
−1
σ (~v)); br(P (~v), σ) := Cσ(~v) ∧ P (fσ(~v)).
Note that the computation of br is easier as compared to that of fr, since its computation
does not require the extra computation of f−1.
For Σˆ ⊆ Σ, we define fr(P (~v), Σˆ) :=
∨
σ∈Σˆ fr(P (~v), σ), and similarly, br(P (~v), Σˆ) :=∨
σ∈Σˆ br(P (~v), σ). Finally, note that fr
∗(P (~v), Σˆ) denotes the set of states which are reach-
able from a state in P (~v) by execution of zero or more transitions of events in Σˆ. Similarly,
br∗(P (~v), Σˆ) denotes the set of states from where a state in P (~v) can be reached by execution
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of zero or more transitions of events in Σˆ. Clearly, fr∗ is useful in characterizing the forward
reachability, whereas br∗ is useful in characterizing the backward reachability.
Given f ∈ F and P (~v) ∈ P(~v), the restriction of f to P (~v), denoted f | P (~v), is the
predicate transformer defined as:
f | P (~v)(Q(~v)) := f(P (~v)
∧
Q(~v))
∧
P (~v),∀Q(~v) ∈ P(~v).
5.2.2 1st order LTL temporal logic & model checking
Propositional linear temporal logic (PLTL) [26] is an extension of propositional logic (PL) by
the temporal logic quantifiers/operator {X,U, F,G,B}, called next time, until, eventually,
always, and before, respectively. The temporal operators describe properties of a state-trace
in a computation:
• X (“next time”): it requires that a property hold in the next state of the state-trace.
• U (“until”): it is used to combine two properties. The combined property holds if there
is a state in the state-trace where the second property holds, and at every preceding
state in the trace, the first property holds.
• F (“eventually” or “in the future”): it is used to assert that a property will hold at
some future state in the state-trace. It is a special case of “until”.
• G (“always” or “globally”): it specifies that a property holds at every state in the
state-trace.
• B (“before”): it also combines two properties. It requires that if there is a state in the
state-trace where the second property holds, then there exists a preceding state in the
trace where the first property holds.
We have following relations among the above operators, where f denotes a temporal logic
formula:
• Ff ≡ TrueUf
• Gf ≡ ¬F¬f
• fBg ≡ ¬(¬fUg)
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So X and U can be used to express the other temporal operators. These are the only
temporal operators that appear in the definition of linear temporal logic.
The following examples show that PLTL temporal logic formulae can be used to easily
express properties such as invariance, recurrence, stability, etc.
Gp means that “along a given state-trace, globally (G) at every state of the trace, p is true”.
It is an invariance (a type of safety) property.
G(p1 ⇒ Fp2) means that “along a given state-trace, globally (G) for every state s of the
trace, if p1 is true at the state s, then p2 will be true at some future (F ) state”. It is a
recurrence (a type of liveness) property.
FGp means that “along a given state-trace, eventually (F ) p will hold globally (G)”. It
is a property of stability (a type of liveness) which requires that the system should
eventually reach a set of states where p holds and stay there forever.
First-order linear temporal logic (FOLTL) [26] is obtained by taking propositional linear
temporal logic and adding to it a First order language L. That is, in addition to atomic
propositions, truth-function connectives, and temporal operators we now also have predi-
cates, functions, individual constants, and individual variables, each interpreted over appro-
priate domain.
A first order language L consists of variable symbols, function symbols and a set of
predicate symbols. The zero-ary function symbols comprise the subset of constant symbols.
Similarly, the zero-ary predicate symbols are known as the proposition symbols. We also
have the predicate equality symbol ≈, and the quantifier symbols ∀ and ∃, which are applied
to individual variable symbols, using the usual rules regarding scope of quantifiers, and free
and bound variables.
The term of L are defined inductively by the following rules:
T1 Each constant c is a term.
T2 Each variable y is a term.
T3 If t1, · · · , tn are terms and f is an n-ary function symbol then f(t1, · · · , tn) is a term.
The atomic formulae of L are defined by the following rules:
AF1 Each 0-ary predicate symbol (i.e. atomic proposition) is an atomic formula.
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AF2 If t1, · · · , tn are terms and ψ is an n-ary predicate then ψ(t1, · · · , tn) is an atomic
formula.
AF3 If t1, t2 are terms then t1 ≈ t2 is also an atomic formula.
Finally, the compound formulae of L are defined inductively as follows:
F1 Each atomic formula is a formula.
F2 If p, q are formulae then (p ∧ q), ¬p are formulae.
F3 If p is a formula and y is a free variable in p then ∃y p is a formula.
The semantics of L is provided by an interpretation I over some domain D. The interpre-
tation I assigns an appropriate meaning over D to the (non-logic) symbols of L: Essentially,
the n-ary predicate symbols are interpreted as concrete, n-ary relations over D, while the
n-ary function symbols are interpreted as concrete, n-ary functions on D.
For defining FOLTL, we assume that the set of symbols is divided into two classes, the
class of global symbols and the class of local symbols. Intuitively, each global symbol has the
same interpretation over all states; the interpretation of local symbol may vary, depending
on the state at which it is evaluated. We now define the language of FOLTL obtained by
adding L to PLTL. First, the terms of FOLTL are those generated by rules T1 − 3 for L
plus the rule:
T4 If t is a term, then Xt is a term (intuitively, denoting the immediate future value of
term t).
Finally, the compound formulae of FOLTL are defined inductively using the following rules:
FOLTL1 Each atomic formula is a formula.
FOLTL2 If p, q are formulae, then so are p ∧ q, ¬p.
FOLTL3 If p, q are formulae, then so are PUq, Xp.
FOLTL4 If p is a formula and y is a free variable in p, then ∃y p is a formula.
The semantics of FOLTL is provided by a first order linear time structure M = (S, x, L),
where S is state set, x : N → S is an infinite state sequence, and L associates with each
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state s an interpretation L(s) of all symbols at s over a domain D such that, for each global
symbol w, L(s)(w) = L(s′)(w), for all s, s′ ∈ S.
Since the terms of FOLTL are generated by rules T1 − 3 for L plus the rule T4 above,
we extend the meaning function - denoted by a pair (M,x) – for terms:
(M,x)(c) = L(·)(c), since all constants are global.
(M,x)(y) = L(·)(y), where y is a global variable.
(M,x)(y) = L(s0)(y), where y is a local variable and x = (s0, s1, s2, · · ·).
(M,x)(f(t1, · · · , tn)) = (M,x)(f)((M,x)(t1), · · · , (M,x)(tn)).
(M,x)(Xt) = (M,x1)(t).
Now the extension of |= is routine. For atomic formulae we have:
M,x |= P iff L(·)(P ) = true, where P is a global proposition.
M,x |= P iff L(s0)(P ) = true, where P is a local proposition and x = (s0, s1, s2, · · ·).
M,x |= ψ(t1, · · · , tn) iff (M,x)(ψ)((M,x)(t1), · · · , (M,x)(tn)) = true.
M,x |= t1 ≈ t2 iff (M,x)(t1) = (M,x)(t2).
We finish off the semantics of FOLTL with-the inductive definition of |= for compound
formulae:
M,x |= p ∧ q iff M,x |= p and M,x |= q.
M,x |= ¬p iff it is not the case that M,x |= p.
M,x |= (pUq) iff ∃j(M,xj |= q and ∀k < j(M,xk |= p)).
M,x |= Xp iff M,x1 |= p.
M,x |= ∃y p, where y is global variable free in p, iff there exists some d ∈ D for
which M [y ← d], x |= p, where M [y ← d] is the structure having global interpretation
I[y ← d] identical to I except y is assigned the value d.
A formula p of FOLTL is valid iff for every first order linear time structure M = (S, x, L)
we have M,x |= p. The formula p is satisfiable iff there exists M = (S, x, L) such that
M,x |= p.
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5.3 Diagnosability as 1st order LTL model-checking
In order to test the diagnosability in the rule-based model, we adopt the test for diagnos-
ability in the automaton setting presented in our past work [46]. The test in the automaton
setting consisted of the following steps:
• Refine the state set X of G by augmenting each state by a binary value label such that
for each x ∈ X, (x, 1) (resp., (x, 0)) represents the traces in L(G) that lead to x and
contain a (resp., no) failure event.
• Take synchronous composition of two copies of the refined G, by first replacing each
event label σ by M(σ). This is called masked synchronous composition.
• Check if the synchronous composition contains a cycle of state-pairs where the two
components carry non-identical labels. (G is diagnosable if and only if no such cycles
are found.)
As in the automaton setting, we introduce a binary valued variable F to indicate whether
or not a fault happened in past. with this the new state variable set becomes,
~x := (~v, F ).
We next need to extend the rule-based model to include this new state-variable. Assuming
that the system starts in a non-faulty state, the initial state is given by the predicate,
I(~x) := I(~v) ∧ [F = 0].
The rule for each event σ ∈ Σ, [Cσ(~v)]⇒ [~v ; fσ(~v)] is extended as follows. For a non-faulty
event,
[Cσ(~v)]⇒ [(~v, F ) ; (fσ(~v), F )
(non-faulty event retains the value of F as unchanged), and for a faulty event,
[Cσ(~v)]⇒ [(~v, F ) ; (fσ(~v), 1)
(faulty event makes the value of F equal to 1).
To facilitate diagnosis, we define a faulty-state predicate,
B(~x) = B((~v, F )) := [F = 1].
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Using this predicate and the extended rule-base model (which includes the new boolean
variable F , new initial condition, and new assignment statements), we perform the diagnosis
test as follows.
Algorithm 2 Consider G with state variables ~v, event set Σ, and model given by:
Initial condition: I(~v) ∈ P(~v), and
Event occurrence rules: ∀σ ∈ Σ : [Cσ(~v)]⇒ [~v ; fσ(~v)].
The set of fault events is denoted by ΣF ⊆ Σ, and the events are partially observed through
a event observation mask M : Σ ∪ {²} → ∆ ∪ {²} with M(²) = ², and M(σ) = ² for each
σ ∈ ΣF .
• Augment the state variables by a boolean variable, F , to identify whether or not a
fault happened in past. The augmented state variable is given by, ~x = (~v, F ). The
augmented system model is given by,
Initial condition: I(~x) = I(~v) ∧ [F = 0]
Event occurrence rules:
∀σ ∈ ΣF : [Cσ(~v)]⇒ [~x ; (fσ(~v), 1)]
∀σ 6∈ ΣF : [Cσ(~v)]⇒ [~x ; (fσ(~v), F )]
Denote the set of states that are visited after a fault has happened in past by the
predicate, B(~x) = B((~v, F )) := [F = 1].
• Perform a “masked synchronous composition” of augmented G with itself to obtain
the system Gd (here ~x and ~y are used to denote the state-variables of the two copies
of the augmented G):
Initial condition: I(~x)
∧
I(~y).
Event occurrence rule: ∀(σ, σ′) ∈ [(Σ ∪ {²})2 − {², ²}] s.t. M(σ) =M(σ′):
[CM(σ)(~x)
∧
CM(σ′)(~y)] ⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (fM(σ)(~x), fM(σ′)(~y))] if σ, σ
′ 6= ²
[CM(σ)(~x)] ⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (fM(σ)(~x), ~y)] if σ 6= ², σ
′ = ²
[CM(σ′)(~y)] ⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (~x, fM(σ′)(~y))] if σ = ², σ
′ 6= ²
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• Using 1st order linear-time temporal logic model checking check whether there exists
an “ambiguous” cycle by model-checking the following formula in Gd:
∃ ~x0, ~y0[EGF (~x = ~x0
∧
~y = ~y0
∧
B( ~x0)
∧
¬B(~y0))]
≡ ∃ ~x0, ~y0[EGAF (~x = ~x0
∧
~y = ~y0
∧
B( ~x0)
∧
¬B(~y0))].
Then G is diagnosable if and only if the above formula does not hold in Gd.
The formula to be model-checked checks the for existence of a state pair (~x0, ~y0) ∈
(X × {0, 1})2 with the property that
• ~x0 is a “faulty” state: B(~x0) holds,
• ~y0 is a “non-faulty” state: ¬B(~y0) holds,
• (~x0, ~y0) is visited infinitely often along some state trajectory starting from the initial
condition I(~x) ∧ I(~y): EGF~x = ~x0 ∧ ~y = ~y0, i.e., exists a path (E) such that globally
(G) along each state of the path, in future (F ) it holds that ~x = ~x0 and ~y = ~y0.
Whenever the above formula is satisfiable, there exists a pair of faulty and non-faulty
traces in G of arbitrary long length that are indistinguishable, and the system is not di-
agnosable. The model-checking software tools such NuSMV [15] can be used to check the
satisfiability of the above formula in Gd.
Example 3 In order to illustrate our result, we give a simple example which consists of a
traffic monitoring problem of a mouse in a maze. The maze, shown in Figure 5.3, consists
of four rooms connected by various one-way passages, where some of them have sensors
installed to detect the passing of the mouse. There is also a cat which alway stays in room
1. The mouse is initially in room 0, and it can visit other rooms by using one way passages,
and it never stays at one room forever. A failure occurs when the mouse visits the room
occupied by the cat. Our task is to monitor the behavior of the mouse by observing the
sensor signals to detect whether or not a failure occurred.
The above problem can be formulated as a failure diagnosis problem in the rules based
model setting. The system to be diagnosed, G, has a single state variable v denoting the
location of the mouse in the maze, and it can take the values in the set {0, 1, 2, 3}; the initial
state is I(v) = [v = 0]; the event set is Σ = {o1, o2, o3, u1, u2, u3}; the event observation mask
M is given as M(ui) = ² and M(oi) = oi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. The rules based model of mouse in a
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Figure 5.3: Mouse in a maze
1. Initial condition: I(v) = [v = 0].
2. Event occurrence rules:
o1 : [v = 0]⇒ [v ; 3]
o2 : [v = 3]⇒ [v ; 0]
o3 : [v = 2]⇒ [v ; 3]
u1 : [v = 0]⇒ [v ; 1]
u2 : [v = 1]⇒ [v ; 2]
u3 : [v = 3]⇒ [v ; 2]
Figure 5.4: Rules based model of mouse in a maze
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maze is shown in Figure 5.4. Since a fault occurs when room 1 is visited, ΣF = {u1}, where
note that u1 is an unobservable event.
In order to verify diagnosability, we augment the state variable v by the binary valued
variable F to obtain ~x := (v, F ). The augmented system model is shown in Figure 5.5.
1. Refined initial condition: I(~x) = (I(v), 0) = [0, 0].
2. Event occurrence rules:
o1 : [v = 0]⇒ [~x ; (3, F )]
o2 : [v = 3]⇒ [~x ; (0, F )]
o3 : [v = 2]⇒ [~x ; (3, F )]
u1 : [v = 0]⇒ [~x ; (1, 1)]
u2 : [v = 1]⇒ [~x ; (2, F )]
u3 : [v = 3]⇒ [~x ; (2, F )]
Figure 5.5: Augmented rules based model of mouse in a maze
Next using the state variable ~y = (u,E) for the second copy of G, we compute the masked
composition of augmented G with itself to obtain Gd as shown in Figure 5.6. Note that the
observable events o1, o2, o3 execute synchronously, whereas the unobservable events u1, u2, u3
occur asynchronously.
We used the NuSMV tool [15] for model-checking the diagnosability condition:
∃ ~x0, ~y0[EGAF (~x = ~x0
∧
~y = ~y0
∧
B( ~x0)
∧
¬B(~y0))].
This NuSMV tool allows computation of masked synchronous composition. We verified that
the mouse in a maze is diagnosable (as expected from our automaton based computation).
Since a rules based model provides a compact model (in contrast, an automaton model
enumerates all the states), we hope that the symbolic techniques developed in this chapter
will allow for the diagnosability verification of industrial size problems.
Further, we can use the diagnosability algorithm developed above together with the
optimal sensor selection algorithm given in [50] to obtain an optimal observation mask while
preserving the system diagnosability. Using this approach, we determined that the event o3
need not be observable for the system to remain diagnosable.
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1. Initial condition: I(~x, ~y) = (I(v), 0, I(u), 0) = [0, 0, 0, 0].
2. Event occurrence rules:
(o1, o1) : [v = 0] ∧ [u = 0]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (3, F, 3, F )]
(o2, o2) : [v = 3] ∧ [u = 3]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (0, F, 0, F )]
(o3, o3) : [v = 2] ∧ [u = 2]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (3, F, 3, F )]
(u1, ²) : [v = 0]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (1, 1, ~y)]
(², u1) : [u = 0]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (~x, 1, 1)]
(u2, ²) : [v = 1]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (2, F, ~y)]
(², u2) : [u = 1]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (~x, 2, F )]
(u3, ²) : [v = 3]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (2, F, ~y)]
(², u3) : [u = 3]⇒ [(~x, ~y) ; (~x, 2, F )]
Figure 5.6: Masked synchronous composition of two augmented mouse in a maze
5.4 On-line Diagnoser using Predicates & their Trans-
formers
We embark upon the on-line computation of a diagnoser once the system has been de-
termined to be diagnosable. Again as with the test for diagnosability, we develop symbolic
methods for the on-line computation of the diagnoser.
The diagnoser maintains two predicates: one, denoted Ek(~x) ∈ P(~x), is an estimate of
the possible states following the occurrence of kth observable event, and the other denoted
Nk(~x) ∈ P(~x) is a subset of Ek(~x) that is reached along trajectories that never visit a state
in B(~x), i.e., along those non-faulty trajectories where ¬B(~x) holds invariantly.
Initially, when no observation has occurred, i.e., when k = 0,
E0(~x) = I(~x), N0(~x) = I(~x) ∧ ¬B(~x).
Upon the occurrence of the (k + 1)th observable event (k ≥ 0), the pair (Ek(~x), Nk(~x))
is updated to obtain the pair (Ek+1(~x), Nk+1(~x)). Whenever Nk(~x) is a strict subset of
Ek(~x), and Nk(~x) 6= false, it means that the system could have executed some trajectories
that visited a faulty state in past (since Ek(~x) 6= false), and also some other trajectories
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(that are indistinguishable to the former) that never visited a faulty state in past (since
Nk(~x) 6= false). In other words, in such a case, there exists an ambiguity as to whether or
not a fault occurred in past. Such an ambiguity does not exist if
[Ek(~x) 6= false] ∧ [Nk(~x) = false],
which means that along all trajectories the system could have executed, a faulty state was
visited in past. A fault is reported by the diagnoser at such a point.
Algorithm 3
• Initiation step:
E0(~x) = I(~x)
N0(~x) = I(~x)
∧
¬B(~x)
• Iteration step: Upon (k + 1)th observation δ ∈M(Σ)− {²}:
Ek+1(~x) = frM−1(δ)[fr
∗
M−1(²)∩Σ(Ek(~x))]
Nk+1(~x) = (fr|¬B(~x))M−1(δ)[(fr|¬B(~x))
∗
M−1(²)∩Σ(Nk(~x))]
Declare a fault if:
[Ek+1(~x) 6= false] ∧ [Nk+1(~x) = false].
In the iteration step, Ek+1(~x) is computed using a reachability computation starting from
Ek(~x) on sequences of unobservable events in M
−1(²) ∩Σ followed a single event in M−1(δ)
(since the (k+1)th observation of δ results from the execution of a sequence of unobservable
events inM−1(²)∩Σ followed by the execution of an event inM−1(δ)). Nk+1(~x) is computed
in a similar way except the forward reachability predicate transformer fr is replaced by it’s
restriction to ¬B(~x), i.e., by (fr|¬B(~x)).
We illustrate the above algorithm for on-line computation of the diagnoser using the
example of mouse in a maze given earlier.
Example 4 Refer to the example of Section 5.3. We can compute the diagnoser as follows:
• k = 0: Since I(~x) = [v = F = 0] and B(~x) = [F = 1], we set
E0(~x) = [v = F = 0], N0(~x) = [v = F = 0].
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• k = 1: There are three observable events o1, o2, o3 ∈ Σ. If the first observation is o1,
then
E1(~x) = [v = 3, F = 0], N1(~x) = [v = 3, F = 0].
If the first observation is o2, then
E1(~x) = false, N1(~x) = false.
(This means o1 as first observation is not possible.) If the first observation is o3, then
E1(~x) = [v = 3, F = 1], N1(~x) = false.
This means that a fault has occurred sometimes in past.
• k = 2: Suppose the first observation (k = 1) is o1. If the next observation is o1, then
E2(~x) = false, N2(~x) = false.
(This means the observation sequence o1o1 is not possible.) If the next observation is
o2, then
E2(~x) = [v = 0, F = 0] = E0(~x), N2(~x) = [v = 0, F = 0] = N0(~x).
If the next observation is o3, then
E2(~x) = [v = 3, F = 0], N2(~x) = [v = 3, F = 0].
Next suppose the first observation (k = 1) is o2. Then since E1(~x) = N1(~x) = false,
it follows that E2(~x) = N2(~x) = false.
Finally suppose the first observation (k = 1) is o3. If the next observation is o1, then
E2(~x) = false, N2(~x) = false.
(This means the observation sequence o3o1 is not possible.) If the next observation is
o2, then
E2(~x) = [v = 0, F = 1], N2(~x) = false.
If the next observation is o3, then
E2(~x) = [v = 3, F = 1], N2(~x) = false.
In both the above cases, we know that a fault has occurred in past.
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• k = 3: After two observations the only predicate pair that is not “re-visited” is the
one following the observation sequence o3o2:
E2(~x) = [v = 0, F = 1], N2(~x) = false.
So we examine this predicate pair. If the next observation is o1, then
E3(~x) = [v = 3, F = 1], N3(~x) = false.
If the next observation is o2, then
E3(~x) = false, N3(~x) = false.
(This means the observation sequence o3o2o2 is not possible.) If the next observation
is o3, then
E3(~x) = [v = 3, F = 1], N3(~x) = false.
Thus the third iteration step does not introduce a predicate pair that has never been
“visited” before, and so there is no need to iterate further. (Said another way, further
iterations will yield a predicate pair that has already been computed above.)
In this case, the on-line computation of the three steps considered above yields a off-line
diagnoser that can be represented as an automaton as shown in Figure 5.7. In Figure 5.7,
when there is a transition from a predicate pair [E(~x) 6= false] ∧ [N(~x) 6= false] to the
predicate pair [E(~x) 6= false]∧ [N(~x) = false], a fault is reported by the diagnoser. Further
since the predicate pair [E(~x) = false] ∧ [N(~x) = false] represents an impossibility, the
diagnoser can be reduced by restricting it to those predicate pairs that are of the type
[E(~x) 6= false] ∧ [N(~x) 6= false]. This restricted diagnoser is shown in Figure 5.8. Any
observation sequence that leads to being outside the restricted diagnoser automaton indicates
that a fault must have occurred in past.
5.5 Conclusion
The rules based modeling formalism of [12] has been used to models discrete event systems
prone to failures. Stuck-signal faults, and system/equipment faults can be easily modeled in
the rules based modeling formalism. Symbolic computation based algorithms for checking
the diagnosability of DESs using 1st order model-checking and for online diagnoser synthesis
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o1
o2
o3
o2
o3
o2 o1 o3
o1
o2
o1 o2 o3
o3
o1
,
,
N1(x)=false
N2(x)=false
E2(x)=[v=0,F=1]
N1(x)=false
E1(x)=false
E0(x)=[v=F=0]
N0(x)=[v=F=0]
E1(x)=[v=3,F=0]
N1(x)=[v=3,F=0]
E1(x)=[v=3,F=1]
Figure 5.7: Diagnoser for mouse in a maze
o2
o3
o1
E1(x)=[v=3,F=0]
N1(x)=[v=3,F=0]
E1(x)=[v=F=0]
N1(x)=[v=F=0]
Figure 5.8: The reduced diagnoser for mouse in a maze
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using predicates and predicate transformers have been developed. The advantage of using
rule-based model is it’s compactness since it uses state-variables to represent states. The
number of rules in the rule-based model is polynomial in number of state variables. Symbolic
methods allow for failure analysis without exhaustively performing a reachability of the
entire state space. Plus, software tools such as NuSMV exist for performing 1st-order model-
checking for systems with finite/bounded state-space.
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Chapter 6
Rules based Modeling of an Assembly
Line and its Diagnosis
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the modeling and failure diagnosis of a miniature assembly
line [11] in the rules-based model developed in [12], and later extended in [43] to also model
faults. The present chapter demonstrates the applicability of the rules-based modeling and
diagnosis techniques to practical manufacturing systems. The demonstration system is a
simple educational test-bed built using LEGO r© blocks that simulates an automated car
assembly-line. This miniature assembly-line shown in Figure 2.7 performs the assembly of
the roof and the chassis. These two parts are transported to the press section from their
respective loading sections, where a vertical press operation presses the two parts together,
and finally the assembled part exits the assembly-line through the unloading section. A
transporter links the chassis, roof, press, and unloading sections. While setting up the
miniature LEGO r© assembly-line, the one built at the University of Massachusetts [10]
served as a prototype.
We present the rules-based models of each of the individual sections, the composition of
which is the entire plant model. The number of rules in transporter, chassis, roof, press,
and unloading sections is 18, 12, 12, 10, and 6, respectively (compare this to a total of
about 1.7 × 106 states for the entire assembly-line if they were to be modeled as an au-
tomaton). For demonstrating the 1st-order temporal logic model-checking based diagnosis
technique developed in [44], we consider a simplified model of the transporter section, and
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analyze it’s diagnosability properties. When the system under examination is not diagnos-
able, sensor refinement/augmentation can be used to make the system diagnosable. We
illustrate through various examples drawn from the LEGO r© assembly-line how sensor re-
finement/augmentation methods can be used to make the system diagnosable.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. A description and rules-based model of
the LEGO r© assembly-line is given in Section 2. Section 3 illustrates diagnosis in rules-based
model using a simplified model of one section of the assembly-line, and also studies how to
design diagnosable systems, again using examples from the LEGO r© assembly-line. Finally
conclusions are provided in Section 4.
6.2 Rule-based models for the Assembly-Line
Instead of having a single large model for the system, and for making modeling simpler,
we develop smaller sized “sub-models” by partitioning the entire system into five sections,
namely, transporter, chassis, roof, press, and unloading. Their description is preceded by a
list of all the events possible in the LEGO r© assembly-line which is given in Figure 6.1.
1. Transporter: Parts are transported from one assembly section to another via the
transporter, which consists of a fixture that is connected to one end of a rack that
is moved by a pinion powered from a gear box motor. An angle sensor mounted on
the same shaft as that of the pinion, counts off the number of rotations of the axle
through it, in order to determine the position of the fixture. The rules-based model of
the transporter is given in Figure 6.2. The initial conditions of this section consist of
the forward and reverse motor turned off (Tf, Tr), and the transporter positioned at
the initial home/unloading position (g, h, i, j, k, l). When the forward motor is turned
on, and the reverse motor is off, the transporter will leave (a) the home position, move
to the press position (b), then leave (c) the press position and reach the roof position
(d). It will then leave (e) the roof position and finally reach the chassis position (f).
If we model the stuck-on fault for the forward motor (Tf), then the following two rules
for the stuck-on fault (TfsonF) and stuck-on recovery (TfsonR) events will be added:
TfsonF : [Tf ∧ Tfson]⇒ [Tfson ; Tfson];
TfsoR : [Tfson]⇒ [Tfson ; Tfson].
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pCup/dn: chassis pusher retracted/not−retracted output events
pRup/dn: roof pusher retracted/not−retracted output events
dRdn/up: part present/absent at roof station dock output events
dCup/dn: part present/absent at chassis station dock output events
pcUon/of: unloading pusher and conveyor motor on/off input events
pUup/dn: unloading pusher retracted/not−retracted output events
No
No
No
No
M8
L6
T3
L7
L8
T2
cCon/of: chassis conveyor motor on/off input events
pCon/of: chassis pusher motor on/off input eventsM3
pPfon/of: press pusher motor on/off input events
pPron/of: press pusher motor on/off in reverse dirn. input events
wPon/of: press winding motor on/off input events
pPup/dn: press pusher retracted/not−retracted output events No
wPup/dn: press weight raised/lowered output eventsT4
pRon/of: roof pusher motor on/off input events Yes
cRon/of: roof conveyor motor on/off input eventsM4
M5
T1
M7
M6
M6
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Press
Roof
Chassis
Unloading
Ifon/of: indexing slide motor on/off forward dirn. input events
Iron/of: indexing slide motor on/off reverse dirn. input events
a : Indexing slide leaving home station during forward movement output event
c/k : Indexing slide leaving press station during forward/reverse movement o/p events
d/h : Indexing slide at roof station during forward/backward movement o/p events
b/j : Indexing slide at press station during forward/reverse movement output events
l : Indexing slide at home or unloading position during reverse movement o/p event
f : Indexing slide at chassis station during reverse movement optput event
g : Indexing slide leaving roof station during forward/reverse movement o/p event
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
M1
M1
A5
A5
A5
A5
A5
A5
A5
Signals Events Controllable
Yes
Yes
Transporter
No
M2
Section
Figure 6.1: Legend of signal and event labels
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Also, the guard for the event a will be weakened as follows:
a : [(Tf ∨ Tfson) ∧ (l ∧ k ∧ j ∧ i ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [l ; a].
The rules for the other events b, c, d, e and f will also be altered in a similar way.
• Initial conditions: Tf , Tr, Tfson, a, b, c, d, e, f = [off, off, off,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0].
• Event occurrence rules:
a : [Tf ∧ (l ∧ k ∧ j ∧ i ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [l ; a];
l : [Tr ∧ (a ∧ k ∧ j ∧ i ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [a ; l];
b : [Tf ∧ (a ∧ k ∧ j ∧ i ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [k ; b];
k : [Tr ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ j ∧ i ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [b ; k]
c : [Tf ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ j ∧ i ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [j ; c];
j : [Tr ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ i ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [c ; j];
d : [Tf ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ i ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [i ; d];
i : [Tr ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [d ; i];
e : [Tf ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ h ∧ g)]⇒ [h ; e];
h : [Tr ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e ∧ g)]⇒ [e ; h];
f : [Tf ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e ∧ g)]⇒ [g ; f ];
g : [Tr ∧ (a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e ∧ f)]⇒ [f ; g];
Tfon : [Tf ∧ Tr]⇒ [Tf ; Tf ];
Tfoff : [Tf ∧ Tr]⇒ [Tf ; Tf ];
Tron : [Tf ∧ Tr]⇒ [Tr ; Tr];
Troff : [Tf ∧ Tr]⇒ [Tr ; Tr].
Figure 6.2: Rules-based model of the transporter section
2. Chassis: The chassis conveyor conveys parts to its docking area. The chassis dock acts
as a buffer with a capacity of one part. Parts are pushed off the dock onto an empty
waiting transporter by the chassis pusher. Sensors monitor the retracted position of
the pusher and presence of part on the dock.
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The initial conditions of the chassis section require that the chassis conveyor motor
(cC) and pusher motor (pC) be off, the pusher should be retracted (puC), there should
be a part loaded on the conveyor (ld), and no part on the chassis dock (dC). Also there
should be no jamming in the chassis section (x). The operation of the chassis section
begins when the conveyor is turned on (cCon), the part rolls off the conveyor and is
delivered to the chassis dock (dCup). Next, the pusher motor is turned on (pCon),
which causes the pusher to operate (puCdn and it pushes the part off the dock (dCoff)
onto the transporter. The pusher returns to its original retracted position (puCup).
The rules-based model of the chassis is given in Figure 6.3.
3. Roof: The rules-based model of the roof is given in Figure 6.4. The roof conveyor
(cR) conveys parts that are loaded on it onto the roof dock which also has a buffer size
of one. The part is pushed off the dock onto a waiting transporter by the roof pusher
(pR). Sensors monitor the retracted position of the pusher (puR) and presence of part
on the dock (dR). The operation of the roof is similar to that of the chassis section,
with the exception that the presence of a part on the roof dock is indicated by dRdn.
This is due to the fact that the roof is black in color and when positioned under a light
sensor causes the dRdn event. The chassis on the other hand is yellow in color and
causes the dCup event to occur when on the chassis dock.
The actuators and sensors in various sections are subject to stuck open/close and stuck
up/down faults respectively. In addition the sections could also encounter various
system faults, such as power failure, software malfunctions, etc.
4. Press: The rules-based model of the press is given in Figure 6.5. The pressing of the
roof and the chassis is done by releasing a heavy LEGO r© block onto a properly posi-
tioned transporter carrying the roof-chassis combination. The mechanism is controlled
by a press pusher and winding motor. Initially the pusher is advanced (pP) so that
the weighted block is suspended at a certain
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• Initial conditions: pC, cC, dC, x, ld, puC=[off, off, dn, dn, up, up].
• Event occurrence rules:
puCup : [(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)]⇒ [puC ; puC];
puCdn : [(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)]⇒ [puC ; puC];
dCup : [(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)]⇒ [dC ; dC];
dCdn : [(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)]⇒ [dC ; dC];
ldup : [(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld)]⇒ [ld ; ld];
lddn : [(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)]⇒ [ld ; ld];
x : [(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cC ∧ pC) ∧ (puC ∧ dC ∧ x ∧ ld)]⇒ [x ; x];
x : [false]⇒ [x ; x];
pCon : [pC]⇒ [pC ; pC]; pCoff : [pC]⇒ [pC ; pC];
cCon : [cC]⇒ [cC ; cC]; cCoff : [cC]⇒ [cC ; cC].
Figure 6.3: Rules-based model of the chassis section
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• Initial conditions: pR, cR, dR, ld, x, puR = [off, off, up, up, dn, up].
• Event occurrence rules:
puRup : [(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cC ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)]⇒ [puR ; puR];
puRdn : [(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)]⇒ [puR ; puR];
dRup : [(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld ∧ f)]⇒ [dR ; dR];
dRdn : [(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)]⇒ [dR ; dR];
ldup : [(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)]⇒ [ld ; ld];
lddn : [(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)]⇒ [ld ; ld];
x : [(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)
∨(cR ∧ pR) ∧ (puR ∧ dR ∧ x ∧ ld)]⇒ [x ; x];
x : [false]⇒ [x ; x];
pRon : [pR]⇒ [pR ; pR]; pRoff : [pR]⇒ [pR ; pR];
cRon : [cR]⇒ [cR ; cR]; cRoff : [cR]⇒ [cR ; cR].
Figure 6.4: Rules-based model of the roof section
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• Initial conditions: pPr, pPf , wP , wtP , pP , x = [off, off, off, up, dn,
dn].
• Event occurrence rules:
wtPup : [(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)
∨(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)]⇒ [wtP ; wtP ];
wtPdn : [(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)
∨(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)
∨(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)
∨(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)]⇒ [wtP ; wtP ];
pPup : [(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)
∨(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)
∨(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)
∨(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)]⇒ [pP ; pP ];
pPdn : [(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)]⇒ [pP ; pP ];
x : [(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)
∨(pPf ∧ pPr ∧ wP ) ∧ (pP ∧ wtP ∧ x)]⇒ [x ; x];
x : [false]⇒ [x ; x];
pPfon : [pPr ∧ pPf ]⇒ [pPf ; pPf ];
pPfoff : [pPf ∧ pPr]⇒ [pPf ; pPf ];
pPron : [pPr ∧ pPf ]⇒ [pPr ; pPr];
wProff : [pPr ∧ pPf ]⇒ [pPr ; pPr];
wPon : [wP ]⇒ [wP ; wP ];wPoff : [wP ]⇒ [wP ; wP ].
Figure 6.5: Rules-based model of the press section
height (wtP). When the pusher motor is reversed (pPr) retracts the weight descends
(wtPdn) and presses the pieces together. After this the pusher is advanced again so as
to mesh with the winding motor (wP) gears, which when switched on raises the block
up again. The retracted position of the pusher (pPup) and the raised position of the
block (wtPup) are monitored by sensors.
The press section is the most complex section of the system and requires precise align-
ment of the pushing, lifting, and positioning mechanisms.
101
5. Unloading: The unloading conveyor (pcU) conveys parts that are pushed onto it by
the unloading pusher (also pcU). There is a sensor for monitoring the retracted position
of the pusher (pU). When a part has to be removed from the transporter positioned at
the unloading section, the conveyor and pusher are turned on simultaneously (pcUon),
and cause the pusher to advance (pUdn). After pushing the assembled roof-chassis the
pusher returns to its retracted position (pUup) and the unloading pusher-conveyor is
turned off (pcUof). The rules-based model of the transporter is given in Figure 6.6.
As with any other motor in the system, the unloading conveyor-pusher motor can get
stuck in the on or off positions. Also the sensors can be stuck in either their up or
dn position. The rules-based model of the system can be altered accordingly to reflect
these faults. For example, in the presence of pcUsoF fault, the altered rule for the
unloading pusher advancing (pUdn) is given as:
pUdn : [(pcU ∨ pcUsoF ) ∧ (pU ∧ l)]⇒ [pU ; pU ].
Similarly, in the unloading section, a motor power fault signal, could cause the motor
to stop. The events of the power fault are powerF and powerR, denoting the power
fault, and recovery from power fault events. Owing to the modeling of the power fault
signal, the rules for the unloading motor event(pcUon) and for the retracted/advanced
positions of the pusher (pUdn, pUup respectively are altered. For example, the altered
rule for pUdn, having a pcUsoF fault, and susceptible to a motor power fault, is given
by:
pUdn : [(pcU ∨ pcUsoF ) ∧ power ∧ (pU ∧ l)]⇒ [pU ; pU ].
We input the rules of each sub-system in NuSMV software tool, followed by a syn-
chronous composition of the models and model checking. The diagnosability test does not
hold for this system, which means that this system are not diagnosable.
6.3 Diagnosis Technique Illustration for Rules-based
Model
The following observation can be made about the detection of a fault: A fault is detected
when a non-faulty guard condition is false, but the consequent event occurs. For this, all
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• Initial conditions: pcU , pcUsoF , pU = [off, off, dn].
• Event occurrence rules:
pUdn : [(pcU ∨ pcUsoF ) ∧ (pU ∧ l)]⇒ [pU ; pU ];
pUup : [(pcU ∨ pcUsoF ) ∧ (pU ∧ l)]⇒ [pU ; pU ];
pcUon : [pcU ]⇒ [pcU ; pcU ];
pcUof : [pcU ∨ pcUsoF ]⇒ [pcU ; pcU ].
Figure 6.6: Rules-based model of the unloading section
traces indistinguishable to a sufficiently long extension of a trace containing the fault should
themselves be faulty. This can be verified through a diagnosability test. For a diagnosable
system, a diagnoser can be constructed to monitor observation sequence and report the
occurrence of a fault.
For the purpose of illustrating the diagnosis technique, we use a simplified model of the
transporter section of the LEGO r© assembly-line (see Figure 6.7). This transporter moves
between home and extended positions, crossing a number of intermediary positions. The
events that can occur in transport system are: Tfon, Tfoff, Tron, Troff, iup, idn, eup, edn.
Tfon/Tfoff refers to the gear-box motor being turned on/off in the forward direction, while
Tron/Troff is for the reverse direction. When the transporter leaves the home position it
enters an intermediary position, i, which is a collection of all those positions whose values
are unimportant from the positioning point of view. The events iup/idn corresponds to
the transporter arriving/leaving the intermediary position from/to the home position; and
eup/edn corresponds to its arriving/leaving the extended position from/to the intermediate
one.
pinionrack
angle sensor 
Intermediate 
positionsHome position Extended position
Gearbox motor
(Angle sensor records intermediate, iup/idn, and extended, eup/edn, positions)
(Issued commands Ifon/Ifoff; Iron/Iroff − for forward/reverse movement)
FIXTURE TRANSPORTER
A1
M1
Figure 6.7: System layout
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We assume that the initial state for the present system is when all the actuators are
off (Troff, Tfoff) and the transporter is in home position (idn, edn). The model of the
transporter in the rules-based formalism is given in Figure 6.8.
• Initial conditions: Tf , Tr, i, e = [off, off, down, down].
• Event occurrence rules:
iup : [Tf ∧ Tr ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [i ; i];
idn : [Tr ∧ Tf ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [i ; i];
eup : [Tf ∧ Tr ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [e ; e];
edn : [Tr ∧ Tf ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [e ; e];
Tfon : [Tf ]⇒ [Tf ; Tf ]; Tfoff : [Tf ]⇒ [Tf ; Tf ];
Tron : [Tr]⇒ [Tr ; Tr]; Troff : [Tr]⇒ [Tr ; Tr].
Figure 6.8: Rules-based model of the transporter without faults
Next, we extend the transporter model to include a fault. Suppose the transport is
prone to the forward motor Tf stuck open fault (TfsonF ), whose occurrence does not alter
the transport speed. The rules-based model of the transporter with this fault is given in
Figure 6.9.
6.3.1 Diagnosability Test
For the transporter of Figure 6.7, we let ~v = (Tf, Tr, Tfson, i, e) denote the state vari-
ables of the transporter, and augment it with the boolean valued variable F to obtain the
augmented state variable ~x = (~v, F ). The augmented rules-based model of the transporter
with TfsonF fault is given in Figure 6.10.
Next using the state variable ~x′ = (~v′, F ′) for the second copy of the augmented model,
where ~v′ = (Tf ′, T r′, T fson′, i′, e′), we compute the masked composition of the two aug-
mented models. The resulting rules-based model is shown in Figure 6.11, where we have
used σ to denote any of the following variables: iup, idn, eup, edn, Tfon, Tfoff , Tron and
Troff .
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• Initial conditions: Tf , Tr, Tfson, i, e = [off, off, off, down, down].
• Event occurrence rules:
iup : [(Tf ∨ Tfson) ∧ Tr ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [i ; i];
idn : [Tr ∧ Tf ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [i ; i];
eup : [(Tf ∨ Tfson) ∧ Tr ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [e ; e];
edn : [Tr ∧ Tf ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [e ; e];
Tfon : [Tf ]⇒ [Tf ; Tf ];
Tfoff : [Tf ∨ Tfson]⇒ [Tf ; Tf ];
Tron : [Tr]⇒ [Tr ; Tr];
Troff : [Tr]⇒ [Tf ; Tr];
TfsonF : [Tf ∧ Tfson]⇒ [Tfson ; Tfson];
TfsonR : [Tfson]⇒ [Tfson ; Tfson].
Figure 6.9: Rules-based model of the transporter with a TfsonF fault
6.3.2 Diagnoser Synthesis
When the system is diagnosable, we can synthesize its on-line diagnoser. Otherwise,
the system can be made diagnosable by sensor refinement using the technique developed in
[50]. For example the transporter of Figure 6.7 prone to the forward motor stuck on fault,
TfsonF , is not diagnosable. If we install a smart sensor that can sense the motor speed,
then the occurrence of the TfsonF can be declared when Tfoff holds, but the motor speed
is non-zero.
For a diagnosable system, we can compute a diagnoser using the method given in [44].
For this, we first obtain a rules-based model of the fault-free system by omitting the rules
for the fault events (such as TfsonF and TfsonR for the transporter system). For each
k ≥ 0, the diagnoser maintains a predicate Nk(~v) ∈ P(~v) that estimates the set of possible
non-faulty states of the system following the occurrence of the kth observable event. Nk(~v)
is computed iteratively as follows:
N0(~v) = fr
∗
M−1(²)∩ΣI(~v); Nk+1(~v) = frM−1(δk)[fr
∗
M−1(²)∩Σ(Nk(~v))],
where δk ∈ M(Σ) − {²} denotes the kth observation. A fault is said to have been detected
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• Refined initial conditions: I(~x) = I(Tf, Tr, Tfson, i, e, F ) = [off,
off, off, down, down, 0].
• Event occurrence rules:
iup : [(Tf ∨ Tfson) ∧ Tr ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [i, F ; i, F ];
idn : [Tr ∧ Tf ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [i, F ; i, F ];
eup : [(Tf ∨ Tfson) ∧ Tr ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [e, F ; e, F ];
edn : [Tr ∧ Tf ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [e, F ; e, F ];
Tfon : [Tf ]⇒ [Tf, F ; Tf, F ];
Tfoff : [Tf ∨ Tfson]⇒ [Tf, F ; Tf, F ];
Tron : [Tr]⇒ [Tr, F ; Tr, F ];
Troff : [Tr]⇒ [Tr, F ; Tr, F ];
TfsonF : [Tf ∧ Tfson]⇒ [Tfson, F ; Tfson, 1];
TfsonR : [Tfson]⇒ [Tfson, F ; Tfson, 0].
Figure 6.10: Augmented Rules-based model of the transporter with a TfsonF fault
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• Initial conditions: I(~x, (~x′) = (I(~v), 0, I(~v′), 0).
• Event occurrence rules:
(iup, iup) : [(Tf ∨ Tfson) ∧ Tr ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [i, F, i′, F ′ ; i, F, i′, F ′];
(idn, idn) : [Tr ∧ Tf ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [i, F, i′, F ′ ; i, F, i′, F ′];
(eup, eup) : [(Tf ∨ Tfson) ∧ Tr ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [e, F, e′, F ′ ; e, F, e′, F ′];
(edn, edn) : [Tr ∧ Tf) ∧ (i ∧ e)]⇒ [e, F, e′, F ′,; e, Fe′, F ′];
(Tfon, Tfon) : [Tf ]⇒ [Tf, F, Tf ′, F ′ ; Tf, F, Tf ′, F ′];
(Tfoff, Tfoff) : [Tf ∨ Tfson]⇒ [Tf, F, Tf ′, F ′ ; Tf, F, Tf ′, F ′];
(Tron, Tron) : [Tr]⇒ [Tr, F, Tr′, F ′ ; Tr, F, Tr′, F ′];
(Troff, Troff) : [Tr]⇒ [Tr, F, Tr′, F ′ ; Tr, F, Tr′, F ′];
(σ, TfsonF ) : [Tf ∧ Tfson]⇒ [σ, F, σ′, F ′ ; σ, F, σ′, 1];
(TfsonF, σ′) : [Tf ∧ Tfson]⇒ [σ, F, σ′, F ′ ; σ, 1, σ′, F ′].
Figure 6.11: Masked synchronization of two augmented rules-based model of the transporter
when Nk(~v) = False.
By computing different possible diagnoser states following all different possible observa-
tion sequences we can obtain the entire diagnoser. The result of such a computation for the
transporter system is shown as an automaton in Figure 6.13. Any observation sequence that
is not accepted by this diagnoser automaton indicates the occurrence of the TfsonF fault.
eup/edn: Extended angle sensor High/Low 
iup/idn: Intermediate angle sensor High/Low 
Legend: 
1
Tfon Tfon
Tron
Tron
2 3
4
Tfon Tfon
Tron
Tron
5
Tron
67
8
edn
Tron
TfonTfon
9
1011
12
iup
idn
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Tfon/off: Transporter forward command on/off
Tron/off: Transporter reverse command on/off
Tfoff Tfoff
Troff
Troff
Tfoff Tfoff
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Troff
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TfoffTfoff
Troff
Figure 6.12: Diagnoser of the transporter with TfsonF fault
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6.3.3 Designing Diagnosable Systems
When the system is diagnosable, we can synthesize its on-line diagnoser. Otherwise, we
can make it diagnosable by sensor refinement or sensor augmentation. For sensor refinement
we can apply the technique of [50]. Also, smart sensors can be installed in the system which
can make the observation of a fault possible. Consider, for example, the transporter of
Figure 6.7 prone to a stuck-on fault in the transporter motor, denoted by TfsonF . We know
from earlier analysis that the system is not diagnosable, when TfsonF is an unobservable
event. Now, if we install a sensor that can sense the motor speed, then the occurrence of the
TfsonF can be declared when Tfoff holds, but the motor speed is non-zero.
In such a situation, we can compute a diagnoser for the transporter system using the
method given in [44]. The result of such a computation is shown as an automaton in
Figure 6.13. Any observation sequence that is not accepted by this diagnoser automaton
indicates the occurrence of the TfsonF fault.
Using NuSMV software tool for model-checking the condition for the diagnosability, we
found that the transporter with TfsonF fault is not diagnosable. The above example demon-
strates that the symbolic technique for diagnosis developed in [44] allows for the diagnos-
ability verification of practical systems.
eup/edn: Extended angle sensor High/Low 
iup/idn: Intermediate angle sensor High/Low 
Legend: 
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Tfoff Tfoff
Troff
Troff
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Figure 6.13: Diagnoser of the transporter with TfsonF fault
In the absence of fault sensing devices, additional sensors may also be added to make the
system diagnosable. Consider, for example, the transporter system, susceptible to a TfsonF
fault. If the transporter is at the initial position (i, e), and is switched on, and then switched
off prior to the occurrence of the iup event, then the iup event should not occur, unless there
is a TfsonF in the system. Further, we can also examine the status of another sensor, e,
which under precisely the same set of controllable events or faults, as those which cause the
event iup to occur, will also cause the eup event to occur. However, neither iup, nor eup event
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should occur, since the motor Tf has already been switched off when it was at the initial
state). Thus, we monitor the extended position sensor, to ensure that it does not switch on,
under these conditions as well. Having the additional e sensor will ensure that while it may
be possible to have the iup event occur in an untimed model as part of its normal behavior,
getting the eup event would indicate a TfsonF fault to the diagnoser. If it does, then we
can declare a TfsonF . Retaining, or adding the e sensor if one were not already present,
thus makes the TfsonF diagnosable, even without adding a smart fault sensor. Hence, the
presence of the Tfson fault can be deduced, even though
∃ ~x0, ~y0[EGF (~x = ~x0
∧
~y = ~y0
∧
[(B( ~x0)
∧
¬B(~y0))])];
remains true and the system is not diagnosable.
Further, in some situations involving faults, in which we are looking for a signal to occur
which never can (since the monitored sensor may be faulty), additional sensors should be
inserted, which would be triggered by precisely the same controllable and uncontrollable
faults events conditions. The presence of such, possibly redundant, sensors can be used for
identifying certain faults.
6.4 Conclusion
The rules-based modeling formalism of [12] has been used to model and study diagnosis
of a simple assembly-line built using LEGO r© blocks. The advantage of using rules-based
model is its compactness since it uses variables to represent states. The number of rules
in the rules-based model is polynomial in number of system signals and faults. Symbolic
technique for failure analysis, based on 1st-order temporal logic model-checking, has been
employed successfully. Existing software tools such as NuSMV software tool aid the analysis
for systems with bounded state-space. If the given system is not diagnosable, refining the
observation mask [50] makes the system diagnosable, and subsequently an on-line diagnoser
for the system can be constructed. This was demonstrated using several examples drawn
from the LEGO r© assembly-line.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, Finite state machines (FSMs) are used for modeling operations of
the assembly line built using LEGO r© blocks , and for the specifications that accomplish the
task of successfully completing the assembly repeatedly. Using the technique of Supervisory
control theory (SCT), we derive a supervisor that enforces the specifications while offering the
maximum flexibility of assembly. Subsequently a controller is extracted from the maximally
permissive supervisor for the purpose of implementing the control by selecting, when possible,
only one controllable event from among the ones allowed by the supervisor. Testing to check
the correctness of the control code is reduced, since the controller is guaranteed to enforce
the specifications.
Rules-based model has been employed in order to aid the rapid development of an accu-
rate system model with faults which can subsequently be used for fault diagnosis. It relies
on establishing rules for all the events in the system. This intuitive way of modeling systems
using a set of rules can be implemented very easily. Any changes in the structure of the
system, such as when actuators or sensors in the system are added or removed can easily
be incorporated in the rules as well. Any added or removed faults can be incorporated in
the rules easily. Once the rules for the DESs have been developed it can be used for fault
diagnosis and diagnoser construction. The rules-based modeling formalism can be applied
to a wide variety of discrete event systems, both timed and untimed, with or without faults,
and having multi-valued signals, and ones possessing DESs abstractions. The main feature of
the rules based modeling formalism is its size, which is polynomial in the number of system
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signals.
In this dissertation we also study diagnosis of DESs. We gave a method for testing the
diagnosability in automaton setting. We developed symbolic techniques for testing diagnos-
ability and computing a diagnoser in rules based modeling formalism. Diagnosability test is
shown to be an instance of 1st order temporal logic model-checking. An on-line algorithm
for diagnoser synthesis is obtained by using predicates and predicate transformers. We mod-
eled an automated car assembly-line in rules-based modeling formalism with faults and used
symbolic technique for failure analysis based on 1st order temporal logic model-checking.
7.2 Future work
Some of the possible extensions to the modeling formalism are:
• Implementation of the supervisory control theory has been demonstrated by way of
the control of a miniature assembly line built from LEGO r© blocks. The main issue of
complexity may be dealt with using modularity as we have demonstrated. A controller
may be extracted from a maximally permissive supervisor either ad-hocly, or if need
be, more systematically using optimal control.
• The derivation of plant models has been at the physical level, with signals and events.
When working at a higher level of abstraction, the top level events are the macro events
with regards to the lower, i.e., physical, level ones. A scheme for such a hierarchical
rules based modeling could be developed for further reducing the complexity involved
in DESs modeling.
• In the rules based modeling formalism the plant is modeled using rules, whereas in
supervisory control algorithms both the plant and the control specification are modeled
as automata. This forces the rules based model to be converted into an equivalent
automata model before any supervisory control algorithms can be used. Modeling
the control specifications as rules is in many cases not practical. Efficient ways of
representing the specification such that the compact form of the rules based model can
be used for directly computing the supervisor for the plant, is an area of for future
investigation.
• A system with failure is not necessarily stable with respect to non-failure states since
once the system enters the failure region it may stay there forever. However, a system
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may be stabilizable in the sense when recovery to legal states may be possible. So,
we need to diagnose the failure when it occurs and enable the corresponding recovery
event so as to return to the normal region. This is called failure diagnosis and recovery
and is an area for the future investigation.
• Extension of 1st-order model-checking method to diagnosis of repeated, intermittent
failures, real-time, and probabilistic systems is a possible future research direction.
• Further applications and software tool development.
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Appendix A
NuSMV Programming For the
Diagnosability Check of Maze
Example
The NuSMV system is a tool for checking finite state systems against specifications in
the temporal logic CTL and LTL. The input language of NuSMV is designed to allow the
description of finite state systems that range from completely synchronous to asynchronous,
and from the detailed to the abstract. The language provides for modular hierarchical
descriptions, and for the definition of reusable components.
The following is the NuSMV programme for the diagnosability check of maze example.
MODULE main
VAR
mainInState:nodeZero;
stateOut: node;
rule1:ruleOrignal(mainInState);
ruleA:rule(rule1.stateOut,rule1.o1,rule1.o2,rule1.o3);
ruleB:rule(rule1.stateOut,rule1.o1,rule1.o2,rule1.o3);
LTLSPEC F(G((ruleA.states.label)=(ruleB.states.label)))
MODULE node
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VAR
state:{0,1,2,3};
label:boolean;
MODULE nodeZero
VAR
state:{0,1,2,3};
label:boolean;
ASSIGN
init(state):=0;
init(label):=0;
MODULE ruleOrignal(stateIn)
VAR
states: node;
stateOut:node;
o1:boolean;
o2:boolean;
o3:boolean;
ASSIGN
init(states.state):=stateIn.state;
init(states.label):=stateIn.label;
next(states.state):=
case
(states.state=0):case
((o1=1)&(o2=0)&(o3=0)):3;
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):3;
esac;
(states.state=3):case
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((o1=0)&(o2=1)&(o3=0)):0;
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):3;
esac;
(states.state=2):case
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):3;
esac;
(states.state=1):case
1:2;
esac;
esac;
next(states.label):=
case
((states.state=0)&(states.label=0)):case
((o1=1)&(o2=0)&(o3=0)):0;
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):1;
esac;
((states.state=3)&(states.label=0)):case
((o1=0)&(o2=1)&(o3=0)):0;
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):0;
esac;
(states.state=1):1;
(states.label=1): 1;
esac;
stateOut.state:=states.state;
stateOut.label:=states.label;
MODULE rule(stateIn,o1,o2,o3)
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VAR
states: node;
stateOut:node;
ASSIGN
init(states.state):=stateIn.state;
init(states.label):=stateIn.label;
next(states.state):=
case
(states.state=0):case
((o1=1)&(o2=0)&(o3=0)):3;
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):3;
esac;
(states.state=3):case
((o1=0)&(o2=1)&(o3=0)):0;
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):3;
esac;
(states.state=2):case
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):3;
esac;
(states.state=1):case
1:2;
esac;
esac;
next(states.label):=
case
((states.state=0)&(states.label=0)):case
((o1=1)&(o2=0)&(o3=0)):0;
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((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):1;
esac;
((states.state=3)&(states.label=0)):case
((o1=0)&(o2=1)&(o3=0)):0;
((o1=0)&(o2=0)&(o3=1)):0;
esac;
(states.state=1):1;
(states.label=1): 1;
esac;
stateOut.state:=states.state;
stateOut.label:=states.label;
The result after executing the program is:
$nusmv catMourseRules.smv
*** This is NuSMV2.1.2 (compiled 2002-11-22 12:00:00)
*** For more information of NuSMV see http://nusmv.irst.itc.it
*** or email to nusmv-users@irst.itc.it.
*** Please report bugs to <nusmv-users@irst.itc.it>.
-- specification A F G ruleA.states.label=ruleB.states.label is true
which means that the maze system is diagnosable.
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